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I. INTRODUCTION
During the last year, controversy has raged over the unprecedented
amount of money authorized by Congress to bail out failing corpo-
rations. Mega-corporations like AIG, Citigroup, and Bank of America,
have received billions of dollars in federal aid.1 Auto industry giants
also received massive bailout funds.2 The policy underlying the
decision to rescue such companies was that they are simply too large to
be allowed to fail. Their role in the economy, the millions of jobs they
provide, and the investments they support, are all deemed to be so sig-
nificant that letting certain corporations fail completely would arguably
have disastrous consequences.3
Opponents of government bailouts asserted that mismanagement
and/or greed caused the corporations to falter and, therefore, these com-
panies deserve to be dismantled by the free market. The feeling is that
they made their bed, and now they must lie in it. Giving them billion-
dollar hand-outs is simply throwing good money after bad. We are not
obligated to nourish these giant corporate persons or even to preserve
their existence.
Interestingly, the bailout debate raises deeper questions about what
it is, exactly, we are bailing out. Who or what is it that we are trying to
save? Is it the millions of employees who depend on the continuation of
* Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law. B.A., Stanford University;
J.D., UCLA School of Law. I gratefully acknowledge Tony Arnold, Deepa
Badrinarayana, Daniel Bogart, Timothy Fort, and Scott Howe for helpful comments on
previous drafts. I also thank the participants of the faculty workshop at Pepperdine
University School of Law where an earlier version of this Article was presented. I
thank Dean John Eastman, Dean Emeritus Parham Williams, and Chapman University
for generous administrative support. Nicole Cohrs, Oriana Kim-Rajab, and especially
Rebecca Conrad provided outstanding research assistance. Special thanks are owed to
Randy Ripken for support throughout all stages of this project. This Article is dedicated
to my parents without whose support it would never have been written.
1. See Julie Creswell, Bank of America May Get More Bailout Money, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 15, 2009, at BI; David Enrich & Deborah Solomon, Citi, U.S. Reach
Accord on a Third Bailout, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 2009, at B1; Pallavi Gogoi, AIG Gets
$30 Billion More to Stay Alive: Bailout Swells after $61.7 Billion Loss Reported, USA
TODAY, Mar. 3, 2009, at 6A.
2. See Edmund L. Andrews et al., Ailing Industries Pressing to Add Billions to
Bailouts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2009, at Al.
3. See Peter S. Goodman, Too Big To Fail?, N.Y. TIMES, July 20,2008, at Al.
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the corporation for their jobs? Is it the shareholders who have risked
their capital by investing in the corporation? Is our concern for the
customers who look to the corporation to provide essential goods and
services? Are we trying to help the suppliers, vendors, and communities
that depend on their ongoing relationships with the corporation for their
own survival? Or, more cynically, does saving the corporation mean
saving the politicians whose political careers are dependent on large
annual corporate contributions?
Proponents of corporate bailouts seem to believe the corporation is
an aggregate of all those human beings who participate in and depend on
the success of the corporate enterprise. When we save the corporation,
we are really saving all the individuals who are behind it. 4 Critics of
this approach seem to view the corporation differently. They see the
corporation as a separate entity that either succeeds or fails on its own
merits. When a corporate person is dysfunctional or begins to fail due to
its own systemic weaknesses, then that corporate person should be left
alone to die.5 Our belief in the survival of the fittest gives us confidence
that other corporate entities that are healthier and more efficient will rise
up and take the place of weaker ones. The national debate over bailing
out corporations reveals that the corporation itself means different things
to different people.
These contrasting views of the corporation reveal fundamental con-
cerns about the nature of the corporation and its status as a person in our
society. This component of the debate is not new. Whether or not the
corporation should be viewed as a separate person that owes and is owed
certain obligations has puzzled legal theorists for years.6 Because of the
4. See generally Jeffrey D. Sachs, Editorial, A Bridge for the Carmakers; The
Future Is in Sight. They Just Need Help Getting There, WASH. POST, Nov. 17, 2008, at
A19 (arguing the necessity of federal intervention preventing the bankruptcy of car
manufacturers in order to protect related industries from failure, safeguard overall
domestic production, and prevent a "resulting cascade of failures").
5. See generally Wayne Allyn Root, Editorial, Let Newspapers Fail!,
JACKSONVILLE OBSERVER, Sept. 26, 2009, http://www.jaxobserver.com/2009/09/26/
letnewspapers-fail/ (citing the long-term economic benefits of a Darwinian approach to
failing corporations and industries, including newspapers, auto manufacturers, and
airlines).
6. See, e.g., ERNST FREUND, THE LEGAL NATURE OF CORPORATIONS (1897);
FREDERICK HALLIS, CORPORATE PERSONALITY: A STUDY IN JURISPRUDENCE
(1930); H.L.A HART, DEFINITION AND THEORY IN JURISPRUDENCE: AN INAUGURAL
LECTURE (1953); ALEXANDER NEKAM, THE PERSONALITY CONCEPTION OF THE
LEGAL ENTITY (1938); S.J. STOLJAR, GROUPS AND ENTITIES: AN INQUIRY INTO
CORPORATE THEORY (1973); George F. Canfield, The Scope and Limits of the
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meaning and value we attach to personhood in our society, deciding
whether a corporation is a person helps us decide what its rights and
duties are and how we can expect it to behave. It gives us a normative
framework for how we should view corporations, how they should be
treated, and how they should treat us.
7
Some argue that the corporation is not a person at all. It is merely a
legal construct, a fictional entity, an artificial creation of the natural
persons who form the corporation for their own purposes.8 It has no
real, independent ontological existence of its own. It has no body, mind,
or soul. The corporation is simply a creature of statute and is dependent
on the law to give it form and function.
Others argue that the corporation is not so much a creature of law as
it is an association forged by the mutual agreement of the individuals
composing it. No corporations would exist and no corporate actions
would occur without the actions and consent of the human beings who
make up the corporate entity. Corporations themselves cannot literally
"act" or "decide" or "intend" apart from their human members. There-
fore, the corporation is better described as a collection, or aggregate, of
its individual human constituents, without whom the corporation would
Corporate Entity Theory, 17 COLUM. L. REv. 128 (1917); Felix S. Cohen,
Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 809
(1935); John Finnis, Corporate Persons II: Persons and Their Associations, in 63
SuPP. VOL.: PROC. OF THE ARISTOTELIAN Soc'Y 267 (1989); Max Radin, The
Endless Problem of Corporate Personality, 32 COLUM. L. REv. 643 (1932); Paul
Vinogradoff, Juridical Persons, 24 COLUM. L. REv. 594 (1924); Martin Wolff, On
the Nature of Legal Persons, 54 L. Q. REv. 494 (1938).
7. This inquiry into corporate personhood involves more than merely asking
whether the corporation is a person for legal purposes. Some scholars argue that
the narrow question of legal personality should be analyzed purely from a
pragmatic instrumentalist approach, i.e., if the corporation is of such a nature that
certain rights and duties can be attributed to it, we can label it a person, making the
existence of corporate personhood dependent on the circumstances. See, e.g., John
Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J.
655, 659-62 (1926); see also Robert S. Summers, Pragmatic Instrumentalism in
Twentieth Century American Legal Thought-A Synthesis and Critique of Our
Dominant General Theory About Law and Its Use, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 861, 865
(1981) (discussing pragmatic instrumentalism and identifying John Dewey as a
subscriber of this approach). From this view, it does not matter whether we decide
a corporation is a person because the term "person" can signify whatever we want
the law to make it signify. See Dewey, supra, at 655. This Article seeks to explore
other dimensions of corporate personhood beyond just the legal status of
corporations.
8. This is often called the artificial entity theory. See infra Part II.A.
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have no identity or ability to function at all.9
Still others believe the corporation is a real person, not an artificial,
fictional entity. It is an independent reality that exists as an objective
fact and has a real presence in society. 10 It is not the law that gives the
corporation life. The corporation exists prior to and separate from the
state; the state merely grants it official recognition and permission to
operate. Under this view, the corporation is separate and distinct from
the individuals who participate in the corporate enterprise. Employees
can come and go without affecting the continuity or identity of the
organization itself. As a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts,
the corporation is a real person, qualitatively different in kind from the
human persons who are part of its make up.
All of these personhood theories of the corporation have their own
normative features. Viewing the corporation as a creature of statute and
a product of state action supports a public-oriented view of corporations
and corporate law. The laws that create corporations should shape them
to act in ways that serve the public interest.11 In contrast, if the corpo-
ration is viewed as an aggregate of its human members, then corpo-
rations should be regarded as the product of private initiative, private
contract, and private property arrangements.12 The rights and duties of
9. Many refer to this view as the aggregate, associational, or contract theory. See
infra Part II.B.; PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE TO CORPO-
RATION LAW: THE SEARCH FOR A NEW CORPORATE PERSONALITY 27 (1993).
10. This theory is called the real entity, natural entity, or organic theory. See infra
Part II.C.
11. Historically, corporate law reflected a public-oriented view of corporate
activity, as early corporations were created for the public benefit. See Morton J.
Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1423, 1425
(1982) (noting that regulatory public law premises had dominated the law of
corporations prior to 1819); see also JAMES W. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE
BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES: 1780-1970 17-21 (1970)
(discussing the special charters that historically were granted to corporations that served
a public utility function); D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J.
CORP. L. 277, 292-96 (1998) (discussing the relationship between early business
corporations and the public interest).
12. This private model of the corporation focuses on the "private relations between
the shareholders of the corporation and management" and on "the governance problems
that arise inside the corporation." David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990
DUKE L.J. 201, 201-02. The distinction between public and private views of the cor-
poration is part of a much larger, ongoing debate over the fundamental nature and pur-
pose of corporations. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, Private Law, Public Interest?: The ALl
Principles of Corporate Governance, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 871, 872, 877-80 (1993)
(discussing the contrasting public and private views of the corporation and corporate
2009
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the corporation are simply the rights and duties of its individual
members. The law should support the rights of these private parties and
avoid interfering with their consensual actions. 13 Alternatively, if the
corporation is a real person in society, it should bear the same legal,
social, and moral responsibilities that natural persons carry, as well as
the same rights and protections.
Each of these conceptions of the corporate person captures elements
of truth, and each makes valid points. But they cannot all be accepted at
the same time because they dictate diametrically opposing results. The
recent controversy over the wisdom of bailing out our country's mega-
corporations has revealed that the role of corporations in our lives is
incredibly complex, and no one of the current legal theories of the
personhood of corporations, standing alone, is sufficient to give us a
completely satisfactory picture of the corporation and its place in our
society. We need more than just our legal academic perspective to un-
derstand the nature and purpose of the large corporation. The corpo-
ration is a multi-faceted entity that requires several different lenses to
see it in its entirety.
The corporation can be viewed independently from the lenses of
philosophy, law, moral theory, political science, sociology, psychology,
organizational theory, theology, and economics, all of which highlight
separate but essential features of the corporate person. Depending on
the lens one chooses to utilize, the subject bears a very different image.
Taken together, they reveal that the corporation is a multi-dimensional
person with coinciding and conflicting properties that defy classification
into a neat and tidy unitary theory. The modem corporation simply can-
not be understood apart from the broader context in which it functions,
and that context cannot be effectively analyzed without multiple aca-
demic perspectives.
This Article takes a unique interdisciplinary approach to the puzzle
of corporate personhood. It draws upon theories from several different
schools of academic thought to shed light on the questions: what is the
corporation, and how should it be treated in our complex, modem
law).
13. The "ideology of 'privatization' has deep roots in political and economic
"laissez-faire" theory. See Joan Williams, The Development of the Public/Private
Distinction in American Law, 64 TEX. L. REV. 225, 225 & n.5 (1985) (discussing
"laissez-faire" theorists' antagonism toward government interference with the private
sphere of economic activity).
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society? Part II of the Article begins with a summary of the legal
theories of corporate personhood. Historically, three different con-
ceptions of the corporation appeared in cycles as political and economic
climates for business changed in America during the 1 9th and 2 0th
Centuries. 14 These legal theories of the corporate person tried to address
the issues of corporate purpose, corporate rights, and corporate respon-
sibility.
These issues can be approached not just from a legal standpoint, but
also from the viewpoint of moral philosophy. Part III turns to the philo-
sophical dimensions of the corporate person. Moral philosophers have
insights about the moral personhood and moral agency of corporations.
Some argue the corporation is incapable of having moral responsibilities
because it has no conscience or capacity to act or feel. 5 Others insist
that the corporation as an entity is a moral person and can carry moral
responsibility for collective acts and intentions that simply cannot be
attributed to any one human member. 16
Part IV explores the organizational, psychological, and sociological
dimensions of the corporate person. Observers of organizational be-
havior regard the corporation as an independent, functional entity with
decision-making systems that give it a formal identity of its own.17 The
corporation's culture, character, and norms have profound effects on the
thoughts, attitudes, and behavior of the individuals who make up the
corporation. To the extent individuals' values and principles are shaped
by their corporate environment, the individuals are in some sense
14. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Cyclical Transformations of the Corporate
Form: A Historical Perspective on Corporate Social Responsibility, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L.
767, 785-813 (2005).
15. See Manuel G. Velasquez, Why Corporations Are Not Morally Responsible for
Anything They Do, 2 Bus. & PROF. ETHICS J. 1, 6-10 (1983) (arguing moral
responsibility cannot be ascribed to corporations because they cannot fulfill the actus
reus and mens rea elements). Some philosophers argue that even if corporations are
capable of acting intentionally, they still do not qualify as moral persons because they
are incapable of having the same moral rights as humans. See, e.g., Thomas Donaldson,
Moral Agency and Corporations, 10 PHIL. CONTEXT 54, 58 (1980).
16. See, e.g., PETER FRENCH ET AL., CORPORATIONS IN THE MORAL COMMUNITY 12-
23 (1992).
17. See ARTHUR G. BEDEIAN, ORGANIZATIONS: THEORY AND ANALYSIS 5 (1980)
("[O]rganizations exhibit a tendency to ... take on a momentum of their own ... [and]
develop a unique self, a distinctive identity, that is referred to . . . as organizational
character."). See generally ORGANIZATIONAL IDENTITY: A READER (Mary J. Hatch &
Majken Schultz eds., 2004); DAVID A. WHETTEN & PAUL C. GODFREY, IDENTITY IN
ORGANIZATIONS 1-80 (1998).
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creatures of the corporation, rather than the other way around.
The complex social dimension of corporations relates to another
aspect of corporate personhood with important consequences for society:
the political role of corporations. Drawing on political theory and phi-
losophy, Part V examines the corporation as a political entity. The ap-
propriate role for large corporations in a democratic society is tied to our
deeper political convictions about government power and individual
freedom.
In addition to the role that corporations play as legal, economic,
social, and political institutions, the corporate person may also have
theological significance. Part VI considers the possible spiritual dimen-
sion of the corporation, an element that is not often discussed in
mainstream academia. Proponents of the spiritual approach to corpo-
rations believe the corporation is an instrument that can be used for the
spiritual flourishing of human beings and for the common good of
society. 8 The normative applications of this spiritual approach to cor-
porations are similar to those of communitarian or stakeholder models of
the corporation.1 9 The maximization of profits is an important objective
of corporate activity, but should not be regarded as the sole or primary
purpose of the corporation.
In stark contrast to the ideas associated with the spiritual model, the
economic theory of the corporation repudiates the belief that corpo-
rations can or should have any purpose beyond acting as a contractual
center for economic exchanges. Part VII describes the neoclassical eco-
nomic paradigm of the corporation. Under this model, the corporate
person is merely a fiction that serves as a nexus of contracts among the
firm's various individual participants. 20  Market forces bring share-
18. See, e.g., TIMOTHY L. FORT, ETHICS AND GOVERNANCE: BUSINESS AS
MEDIATING INSTITUTION 25-28 (2001); see also id. at 179-98 (discussing the
connections between theology and business).
19. See R. Edward Freeman, A Stakeholder Theory of the Modern Corporation, in
ETHICAL THEORY AND BUSINESS 56, 56 (Tom L. Beauchamp & Norman E. Bowie eds.,
6th ed. 2001). "[S]takeholder theory argues that the corporation ought to be managed
for the benefit of all affected by corporate actions, not simply the shareholders." FORT,
supra note 18, at 125. Kenneth Goodpaster explains that the term "stakeholder" was
invented in the 1960s as a play on the term "stockholder" to indicate that there are other
members of the corporation, in addition to the stockholders, who have a "stake" in the
decisions of the firm. Kenneth E. Goodpaster, Business Ethics and Stakeholder
Analysis, 1 Bus. ETHICS Q. 53, 54 (1991).
20. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
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holders, managers, creditors, employees, suppliers, and others together
to seek the benefit of their mutual bargains. Their web of interrelated
contracts is what constitutes the corporation. As a normative matter, the
private parties who participate in the corporate enterprise should be free
to order their affairs in whatever manner they choose without
government regulation or interference. The corporation's primary
concern should be to maximize profits; it should not be asked to carry
the same social, moral, or ethical duties of persons in society. The nexus
of contracts model has become the dominant paradigm in legal academia
today. This Article argues that the model's preoccupation with the
contractual elements of the corporation obscures the complex reality of
the corporate person.
Part VIII of this Article presents an argument for adopting a multi-
dimensional model of the corporation. The many interdisciplinary ap-
proaches to corporate activity all represent different and valid ways of
analyzing the separate dimensions of the corporate person. Each theory
informs the other, and only when they are taken together can they tell
the full story of the corporation.
This Article asserts that laws and public policies must be sensitive
to the multi-faceted nature of the corporation. What the recent debate
over corporate bailouts teaches us is that corporations are multi-
dimensional creatures that serve different functions for different
people. 2' In some sense, we are all dependent on the corporation for our
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 311
(1976). Michael Jensen and William Meckling are generally credited with first
formulating the model of the corporation as a nexus of contracts in 1976. See Charles
R.T. O'Kelley, The Entrepreneur and the Theory of the Modern Corporation, 31 J.
CORP. L. 753, 763 (2006). They described the corporation not as a separate and
independent, real entity, but rather, as the center of a set of contracts. Jensen &
Meckling, supra, at 311. Many legal commentaries have utilized and elaborated on this
theory to explore its implications for corporate ownership and control. See, e.g., Barry
D. Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, Anti-Takeover Amendments, Managerial Entrench-
ment, and the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 71 VA. L. REv. 1257 (1985);
Henry N. Butler, The Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV.
99 (1989); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89
COLUM. L. REv. 1416 (1989); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in
Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395 (1983); William A. Klein, The Modern Business
Organization: Bargaining Under Constraints, 91 YALE L.J. 1521 (1982); Jonathan R.
Macey, Fiduciary Duties as Residual Claims: Obligations to Nonshareholder
Constituencies from a Theory of the Firm Perspective, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 1266
(1999).
21. While I have used the national debate over corporate bailouts as a way of
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well-being, and it is in turn dependent on us for its well-being. The
corporation is a constantly evolving entity, and its place in our lives
depends on our own continually changing moral, legal, philosophical,
and political imagination. The law of corporations should reflect the dy-
namic nature of the theories that describe the corporate person, and
should avoid any narrow or fixed framework for analyzing corporate
activity.
II. LEGAL THEORIES OF THE CORPORATE PERSON
A. Corporation as an Artificial and Dependent Person
One way of describing the corporation is to say that it is nothing
more than a legal construct. It is an artificial creation of human beings
and the law. We give it personhood status solely as a legal fiction to
facilitate commerce. By calling the corporation a person, the law grants
it the capacity for legal relations of all kinds. The corporation has
standing to enter into contracts, to hold property, to sue and be sued, and
ultimately to carry on business in the corporate name.22 The artificial
person theory is thus composed of two separate elements: (1) the fic-
tional aspect, and (2) the dependence aspect, i.e., the corporation's de-
pendence on the law to give it legal personality.
The fictional component emphasizes that the corporation is a
human invention, unlike the natural persons who create the corporation
for their own use.23 When we refer to it as a person, we do so only out
of convenience. It is an abbreviation we adopt for the practical purpose
of making the corporation the bearer of specific rights and duties under
illuminating the broader issue of corporate personhood, this Article is neither about the
bailout controversy itself nor about its appropriate resolution. Rather, I believe the
arguments surrounding the corporate bailout debate reveal deeper concerns about who
or what it is we are trying to save with bailout money. It is this topic about the complex
nature and role of the corporate person in our society that is addressed by this Article.
22. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 3.02 (2005).
23. See Jeffrey Nesteruk, Persons, Property, and the Corporation: A Proposal for
a New Paradigm, 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 543, 564 n.133 (1990) ("A corporation is
artificial in that it is a human creation subject to human choices."); James V. Schall, The
Corporation: What Is It?, 4 AVE MARIA L. REv. 105, 118 (2006) (describing the
corporation as primarily a human invention created for man's use).
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the law.24 No one actually believes a corporation is a real person.
Everyone recognizes that this fictional person is merely a legal
abstraction. In fact, legal personality can be given to just about any
object if it is deemed to serve the ends of justice.25
The dependence aspect of the corporation means that corporations
cannot exist without the law's consent. Also referred to as the con-
cession theory, it argues that corporations are legally formed when the
state approves their charters, and therefore, the personhood of corpo-
rations is merely a government concession.26 The classic statement of
the theory is Chief Justice Marshall's description of the corporation in
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward: "A corporation is an
artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation
of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those prop-
erties which the charter of its creation confers upon it ....,,27 The cor-
poration is artificial, fictional, and conditional because it cannot come
into being unless and until the law sanctions it.
The artificial person or concession theory dominated American
thinking about corporate personhood in the first half of the 19th
Century.28 Corporations during that period required a special act of the
state legislature to approve their charters on a case by case basis.
29
24. See JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 27 (Roland
Gray ed., MacMillan 1921) (stating that "person" usually means a human being, "but
the technical legal meaning of a 'person' is a subject of legal rights and duties"); Wolff,
supra note 6, at 506 (arguing that the legal fiction of the corporation is an abbreviation
allowing us to apply the same legal rules to human beings and corporations).
25. See Richard Tur, The "Person" in Law, in PERSONS AND PERSONALITY: A
CONTEMPORARY INQUIRY 116, 121 (Arthur Peacocke & Grant Gillett eds., 1987)
(referring to a case where an Indian idol was given legal personality); see also Arthur
W. Machen, Jr., Corporate Personality, 24 HARV. L. REv. 347, 350 n.9 (1911) (noting
that purely inanimate objects may be personified, e.g., the estate of a deceased person, a
jury, or a community).
26. See Phillip I. Blumberg, The Corporate Entity in an Era of Multinational
Corporations, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 283, 292-93 (1990). The theory has been called
several different names, including the state grant theory, the fictitious personality
theory, the artificial personality theory, and the concession theory. Ron Harris, The
Transplantation of the Legal Discourse on Corporate Personality Theories: From
German Codification to British Political Pluralism and American Big Business, 63
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1421, 1424 (2006).
27. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819).
28. See William W. Bratton, Jr., The "Nexus of Contracts " Corporation: A Critical
Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 407, 434 (1989); Michael J. Phillips, Reappraising the
Real Entity Theory of the Corporation, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1061, 1065 (1994).
29. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 188-201 (2d ed.
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States typically granted corporate charters for enterprises that served a
public function and met specific social needs, e.g., public utilities,
banks, insurers, transportation services, and water works.3" "[T]he cor-
porate privilege was granted sparingly; and only when the grant seemed
necessary in order to procure for the community some specific benefit
otherwise unattainable."'" Thus, legislative approvals of charters were
seen as special grants or privileges by the sovereign, underscoring the
view of corporations as concessions of the government. The state
played a decisive role in creating corporations and circumscribing their
actions within limited spheres of activity. Early charters often contained
specific provisions maintaining some measure of control over corpo-
rations to protect the public from abusive corporate practices.3 2
The fiction theory normatively supported a public oriented view of
corporations and corporate law. Because the corporation derives its ex-
istence from the state, the corporation presumably is incorporated for
public purposes and the state can regulate its operations for the public
interest.33 What the state can give, the state can take away. The very
1985).
30. See HURST, supra note 11, at 15, 17-18; William W. Bratton, Jr., The New
Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REv.
1471, 1484 (1989); see also Martha T. McCluskey, The Substantive Politics of Formal
Corporate Power, 53 BUFF. L. REv. 1453, 1475-76 (2006). Because corporations were
considered bodies created by law for the purpose of attaining some public end, they
were therefore "arms of the state." Warren J. Samuels & Arthur S. Miller, Intro-
duction: Corporate America, in CORPORATIONS AND SOCIETY: POWER AND
RESPONSIBILITY 1, 3 (Warren J. Samuels & Arthur S. Miller eds., 1987) [hereinafter
CORPORATIONS AND SOCIETY].
31. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 549 (1933) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
32. For example, states often strictly regulated banking activity through limited
powers granted in bank charters and through strict construction of those charters by the
courts. Gregory A. Mark, Comment, The Personification of the Business Corporation
in American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1441, 1444 (1987). Sometimes legislatures re-
quired corporations to give equal voting power to smaller investors, provide favorable
treatment to the poor, or ensure that investors and managers could be individually liable
for corporate debts. See McCluskey, supra note 30, at 1478. At times, states even
regulated the prices that corporations could charge and the rate of return that investors
could earn. Id. at 1476. Courts also tended to support broad state powers over corpo-
rations. See, e.g., Leep v. St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. Co., 25 S.W. 75, 81 (1894) (holding
that even though legislatures lacked the power to dictate how natural persons paid their
employees, legislatures had the power to do so with corporate employers).
33. Many legal opinions reflected this view. See, e.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43,
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laws that create corporations can also constrain them to act in ways that
benefit, or at least do not harm, the public.
34
By the mid-19th Century, special chartering gave way to general
incorporation statutes. Special incorporations for businesses were re-
garded as the corrupt result of legislative bribery, political favoritism,
and monopolistic practices.35 In response to public dissatisfaction,
states adopted general incorporation statutes allowing businesses to
incorporate freely without special grants from the legislature.3 6 The act
of incorporation with the state was merely a formality of filing and
played little role in the personhood of corporations. The idea that corpo-
rations existed only because of the concession of the state held far less
force and was replaced with the belief that the corporation actually owed
its existence to the individuals who formed the corporation to conduct
their business. As a result, the artificial person theory of the corporation
diminished in relevance over time.
B. Corporation as an Asgre gate Person
An alternative view of the corporate person arose during the last
half of the 19th Century. The aggregate theory emphasized that the
74 (1906) ("[T]he corporation is a creature of the State. It is presumed to be
incorporated for the benefit of the public."). Chief Justice Marshall explained it as an
exchange between the corporation and the state: "The objects for which a corporation is
created are universally such as the government wishes to promote. They are deemed
beneficial to the country; and this benefit constitutes the consideration, and, in most
cases, the sole consideration of the grant [of incorporation]." Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v.
Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 637 (1819); see also A.A. Sommer, Jr., Whom Should the
Corporation Serve? The Berle-Dodd Debate Revisited Sixty Years Later, 16 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 33, 36 (1991) (noting that while the organizers of early corporations did expect
profits from the business, "the corporations were to serve a public purpose and as such
were overseen closely by the state which sanctioned their organization").
34. See Timothy L. Fort, Goldilocks and Business Ethics: A Paradigm That Fits
"Just Right", 23 J. CORP. L. 245, 260 (1998).
35. See Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited. The Development of Corporate
Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV 173, 181 (1985); Mark, supra note 32, at 1453-54; see also
CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE
BEHAVIOR 20 (1975).
36. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 29, at 512 ("It was cheap and easy to incorporate
under general laws-a few papers filed, a few forms and signatures; the privilege of
incorporation lay open to whoever wanted it."); see also STONE, supra note 35, at 20
(noting that by the end of the 19th Century, general incorporation statutes had displaced
special charters entirely).
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corporation could not be formed without the action and agreement of
human beings. In fact, no corporate acts would ever occur without the
human persons who made up the corporate entity. Therefore, the corpo-
ration was seen more as a collection, or aggregate, of individuals who
contracted with each other to utilize the corporation for their mutual
benefit.37 The aggregate theory, also called the contractual or associ-
ational theory, holds that the corporate person has no existence or
identity that is separate and apart from the natural persons in the
corporation. 38 The entity is "owned, managed, and administered by
people, [and] its so called actions are but manifestations of actions by
real persons. 39 It makes no sense to see the corporation literally as a
distinct person.
Under this view of the corporate person, "the rights and duties of an
incorporated association are in reality the rights and duties of the
persons who compose it, and not of an imaginary being. ' 40 The United
States Supreme Court implicitly relied on this view in Santa Clara v.
Southern Pacific Railroad when it declared that a corporation is a person
for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment and, thus, its property cannot
be taxed differently from the property of individuals. 41 The underlying
reasoning was that the corporation's property was really just the
property of the individual shareholders who owned the corporation, and
therefore should be protected in the same manner.42 "To deprive the
37. This theory resonates with an "inherence theory" of corporations which
suggests that "men have a natural right to form a corporation by contract for their own
benefit, welfare, and mutual self-interest." ROBERT HESSEN, IN DEFENSE OF THE
CORPORATION 22 (1979). "In this conception, the corporation was not a creature of the
state but of individual initiative and enterprise." Horwitz, supra note 35, at 184-85.
38. 1 VICTOR MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 1-2
(2d ed. Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1886) (It is "self-evident that a corporation is not
in reality a person or a thing distinct from its constituent parts. The word 'corporation'
is but a collective name for the corporators or members who compose [it] ....");
PATRICIA H. WERHANE, PERSONS, RIGHTS, AND CORPORATIONS 51 (1985) ("Corpo-
rations have no reality over and above their constituents, because they are created by
and function only because of them.").
39. Donald R. Cressey, The Poverty of Theory in Corporate Crime Research, in 1
ADVANCES IN CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY 31, 36 (William S. Laufer & Freda Adler eds.,
1989).
40. 1 MORAWETZ, supra note 38, at 3.
41. 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
42. Morton Horwitz explained that the Court's decision relied on the aggregate
theory arguments of John Pomeroy, counsel for the railroad company, and Justice Field
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corporation of its property ... is, in fact, to deprive the corporators of
their property .... [T]he courts will look through the ideal entity and
name of the corporation to the persons who compose it, and protect
them.
43
The normative implications of the aggregate paradigm are that
corporations should be regarded as the product of private initiative and
natural market forces, that corporations reflect forms of private property
and private contract, and that corporate law should therefore be viewed
as private law, not public law. Unlike the artificial person or concession
theory, the aggregate theory supports a hands-off, anti-regulatory
approach to corporations. 44 Instead of seeing the corporation as existing
for the public interest, the aggregate theory views the corporation as
existing for the private interests of the individuals who constitute it. The
role of the law is to support the rights of these private parties and avoid
interfering with their consensual actions.45
By the early 20th Century, dispersed shareholder ownership and
immense growth in the size of corporations revealed a deep separation
46scteeof ownership and control in large corporations. Widely scattered
shareholders of giant corporations were passive investors with small
individual holdings who did not control the corporation in any mean-
in his circuit court opinion in the companion case, County of San Mateo v. Southern
Pacific Railroad Co., 13 F. 722 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882). See Horwitz, supra note 35, at
177-78. Justice Field wrote: "It would be a most singular result if a constitutional
provision intended for the protection of every person against partial and discriminating
legislation by the states, should cease to exert such protection the moment the person
becomes a member of a corporation." County of San Mateo, 13 F. at 744.
43. Railroad Tax Cases, 13 F. 722, 747-48 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882), appeal dismissed as
moot sub nom. San Mateo v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 116 U.S. 138 (1885); Santa Clara v. S.
Pac. R.R. Co., 18 F. 385 (C.C.D. Cal. 1883), affd, 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
44. See Bratton, supra note 30, at 1489-90.
45. See David Millon, The Ambiguous Significance of Corporate Personhood, 2
STAN. AGORA: ONLINE J. LEG. PERSP. 39, 42 (2001). Alternatively, a broader
conception of the aggregate paradigm could support a more communitarian view of the
corporation. For example, if one were to say that the corporation is an aggregation of
not only the corporation's individual shareholders, but also its employees, creditors,
suppliers, and local communities, then their corporate membership presumably entitles
them to certain rights and protections, and the law should support their interests as well.
See Abram Chayes, The Modern Corporation and the Rule of Law, in THE
CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 25, 41 (Edward Mason ed., 1959) [hereinafter
CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY].
46. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANs, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 119-25 (1932).
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ingful sense. The large corporation appeared to take on its own identity
as a functioning organization, separate from the individual shareholders
who came and went without changing the nature of the organization's
operations. It made it difficult to continue to see the corporation as an
aggregate of the individual shareholders.47 The corporation by its nature
had a longevity, a perpetual existence, that its individual members did
not share. Because the aggregate theory was not an entirely satisfactory
description of the corporate person, a new theory, the real entity theory,
emerged to explain the personhood of corporations.
C. Corporation as a Real and Independent Person
At the turn of the 20th Century, the real entity, or natural entity
theory became the popular way of describing the corporate person. 48 It
posited that the corporation's existence is not only independent of the
individual members who compose the corporation, but also independent
of the state that legally recognizes its form.
In contrast to the artificial person theory, the real entity theory
views the corporation as an undeniably real and non-imaginary person.49
As one commentator suggested, that which is artificial can still be quite
real. An artificial lake is not an imaginary lake; it is something very real
that we can see and touch.S0 Although a corporate legal personality can
be regarded as a fiction, the entity which is personified is certainly not
fictional. It is a full-fledged, living reality that exists as an objective fact
and has a real personality in society.5'
Rejecting the concession theory's view of the corporation as
dependent on the state for its existence, the real entity theory holds that
the corporation exists prior to and separate from the state. Just as the
47. See Phillips, supra note 28, at 1067-68.
48. See Jess M. Krannich, The Corporate "Person": A New Analytical Approach
to a Flawed Method of Constitutional Interpretation, 37 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 61, 80
(2005); see also Blumberg, supra note 26, at 295 (noting that the theory had different
names: "natural entity, or real entity, or realism theory").
49. See W. Jethro Brown, The Personality of the Corporation and the State, 21 L.
Q. REv. 365, 370 (1905).
50. Arthur W. Machen, Jr., Corporate Personality, 24 HARv. L. REv. 253, 257
(1911).
51. See Katsuhito Iwai, Persons, Things and Corporations: The Corporate
Personality Controversy and Comparative Corporate Governance, 47 AM. J. COMP. L.
583,584 (1999).
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state may record the birth of every baby, or the sale of every land parcel,
so does the state record the formation of every corporation-a formation
that occurs by virtue of agreement of the private parties who constitute
the business, not by virtue of any state action.52 The large corporation is
simply a natural outgrowth of the economic tendency toward business
combination."3 Rather than being a creature of the state, the corporation
is a naturally existent entity "which has compelled the law to grant it
official recognition.
5 4
The real entity theory views the corporation as distinct from the
individuals who participate in the corporate enterprise. Real entity
proponents believe the corporation is much more than the sum of its
individual parts. When several people come together to form an associ-
ation for some shared purpose, the group entity is larger than and
different in kind from the members themselves.55 The corporation is an
independent entity whose existence and identity remain the same, even
if its membership of individuals changes over time or is in a constant
state of flux. 5 6 This is because one of the distinguishing features of
52. Robert Hessen, Editorial, Creatures of the State? The Case Against Federal
Chartering of Corporations, BARRON'S NAT'L Bus. & FIN. WKLY., May 24, 1976, at 7.
The state merely adds "legal legitimacy" to the corporation by its public recognition of
the entity, but it has nothing to do with the actual creation of the corporation. Roger
Pilon, Corporations and Rights: On Treating Corporate People Justly, 13 GA. L. REV.
1245, 1305 (1979). "What really happens is that the state finding certain persons
standing in a certain relation to each other and acting as a unit, upon a request from
them, authorizes the group to embark upon a certain course of activity." George F.
Deiser, The Juristic Person, 57 U. PA. L. REV. 300, 304 (1909).
53. Horwitz, supra note 35, at 197; Krannich, supra note 48, at 81 (noting that the
real entity metaphor grew out of the belief that the corporate entity seemed to be a
natural way of conducting business).
54. Brown, supra note 49, at 370; see also Edward S. Mason, Introduction, in
CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY, supra note 45, at 1 (arguing that the law does not
create the corporation but instead acts simply as "a device for facilitating and
registering the obvious and the inevitable"). One commentator observed that corpo-
rations "existed and were recognized before a theory was invented to explain their
existence and recognition." W.M. Geldart, Legal Personality, 27 L. Q. REV. 90, 96
(1911).
55. See Bryant Smith, Legal Personality, 37 YALE L.J. 283, 286 (1928).
56. See PETER A. FRENCH, COLLECTIVE AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 19-30
(1984) (demonstrating that the identity of a corporation is independent of the aggregate
identities of those associated with it at any particular time, in spite of the fact that its
operations require that persons be associated with it); Brown, supra note 49, at 366-67
(observing that the corporation remains the same although its personnel changes
entirely). In fact, Arthur Machen argued that "any group whose membership is
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large corporations is their longevity. "[O]rganizations can persist for
several generations . ..without losing their fundamental identity as
distinct units, even though all members at some time come to differ from
the original ones."57
Under the real entity view, a corporation can have its own will and
pursue its own goals in a way that cannot be equated with the will and
goals of each individual member. The corporation has a "collective
consciousness" or "collective will" that results from discussion and
compromise among the individual members, and may not reflect the
particular preferences of any one person.58 Actions of the corporation
are qualitatively different from those of its individual constituents, who
each may have contributed some part to the act, but no one person can
be said to be responsible for the unified corporate action. 9 "[A]n
organization may produce consequences, like profits, that are true
properties of the organization; they come about because of the way
changing, is necessarily an entity separate and distinct from [its] constituent members."
Machen, supra note 50, at 259. Some even argued that corporations can exist for
periods of time, with all of their rights and duties, despite having no members
whatsoever. Roger Scruton, Corporate Persons, in 63 SuPP. VOL.: PROC. OF THE
ARISTOTELIAN SoC'Y 239, 246 (1989); see also MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS,
AND ORGANIZATION 46-49 (1986) (telling an allegory of the "Personless Corporation"
to show that one may "strip the corporation of all individuals and yet preserve, both
conceptually and legally, the identity of [the corporation]").
57. PETER M. BLAU & W. RICHARD SCOTT, FORMAL ORGANIZATIONS: A
COMPARATIVE APPROACH 1 (1962). In fact, some argue that the existence of the
organization "typically predates the membership in it of any particular individual."
DAN-COHEN, supra note 56, at 50; see also PETER F. DRUCKER, CONCEPT OF THE
CORPORATION 21 (1972) ("The corporation is permanent, the shareholder is transitory.
It might even be said without much exaggeration that the corporation is really socially
and politically a priori whereas the shareholder's position is derivative .... ).
58. See OTTO GIERKE: ASSOCIATIONS AND LAW: THE CLASSICAL AND EARLY
CHRISTIAN STAGES 7 (George Heiman ed. & trans., 1977) ("The association, or group,
is a living entity .... Every group has a real and independent communal life, a con-
scious will, and an ability to act that are distinct from the lives and wills of its
individual members."); Deiser, supra note 52, at 301, 310 (referring to the "collective
consciousness" as the corporation's personality).
59. I have discussed elsewhere the ways in which the acts of the corporation
sometimes may not sensibly be reduced to the actions of individuals within the organ-
ization. See Susanna M. Kim, Characteristics of Soulless Persons: The Applicability of
the Character Evidence Rule to Corporations, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 763, 790-91; see
also WERHANE, supra note 38, at 51 (arguing that "not all actions of corporations are
redescribable merely as individual actions").
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people behave together, not just as aggregate effects of their separate
behaviors. 60 Corporations can initiate and be responsible for their own
actions and intentions. From a criminal law perspective, a corporation
could be convicted of a crime, due to its own organizational acts and
culpable intent, independent of any criminal conviction of particular
individuals within the corporation. 61  By assuming that the corporation
is a separate person, the real entity theory allows it to be treated much
like an autonomous individual.
Real entity theorists believe this view of corporations comports
with common sense and is consistent with our natural compulsion to see
organizations as independently functioning realities.62 It is relevant that
we regard corporations as persons in our ordinary thinking and
discourse. Our normal linguistic usage reflects our perception of corpo-
rations as persons who "act," "decide," "think," and "feel," on their own.
We say, for example, that Nike denied that it knew about the
wrongdoing, Exxon believes it treats its employees fairly, AOL signed a
merger agreement with Time-Warner, and the Disney Channel loves
young audiences. We use singular verbs and possessive pronouns when
we refer to corporations,63 and we describe groups in terms that do not
refer to their constituent members.64 The corporation's personhood
60. MICHAEL KEELEY, A SOCIAL-CONTRACT THEORY OF ORGANIZATIONS 230
(1988).
61. Corporate criminal liability emerged at the turn of the 20th Century, about the
time the real entity theory took hold. The seminal case recognizing corporate criminal
liability was New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Co. v. United States, 212 U.S.
481 (1909). For discussions of the real entity theory's implications for corporate
criminal liability, see Patricia S. Abril & Ann Morales Olazabal, The Locus of
Corporate Scienter, 2006 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 81, 103-10 (2006); Eric Colvin,
Corporate Personality and Criminal Liability, 6 CRIM. L.F. 1, 1-2, 23-25 (1995).
62. See Harold J. Laski, The Personality of Associations, 29 HARV. L. REv. 404,
405 (1916) ("Clearly, there is compulsion in our personalising [the corporation]. We do
it because we must. We do it because we feel in these things the red blood of a living
personality."); Machen, supra note 25, at 363 ("We do not need to be instructed to
regard a corporation as an entity and to regard that entity as a person: our minds are so
constituted that we cannot help taking that view.").
63. See Sanford A. Schane, The Corporation Is a Person: The Language of a Legal
Fiction, 61 TUL. L. REv. 563, 601 (1987). We say "[tlhe corporation has aligned itself
with labor," not "[t]he corporation have aligned themselves with labor." Id. Sanford
Schane's article discusses the linguistic basis for treating the corporation as a person.
He argues that it is a part of ordinary language to speak about institutions as though
they are persons, and that this way of speaking is independent of the law. Id. at 595.
64. "For example, while Germany is said to be populous, no individual German can
be so described; and when one says that a corporation is large, one is not referring to the
2009
116 FORDHAMJOURNAL Vol. XV
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW
status is woven into the fabric of our language, indicating the
corporation's nature as a real and independent person, or at least our
inevitable tendency to accept it as such. This is the way we talk and
think about corporations, and that has to be relevant for something.65
The real entity theory supports two contrasting normative visions of
the corporation. On the one hand, if the corporation is viewed as a real
and natural entity, much like an individual person, the corporation
should be entitled to the same rights and privileges that are afforded to
natural persons. Property rights in particular stand out among those that
ought to be protected. 66 Indeed, in the constitutional arena, the Supreme
Court has held that corporations are entitled to protections of their
property rights.67 Interestingly, the Supreme Court has also held that
corporations are entitled to various liberty rights under the
Constitution. 68 The Court has often justified those decisions by utilizing
size of its members." Phillips, supra note 28, at 1105 n.237 (citing Richard T. De
George, Social Reality and Social Relations, 37 REv. METAPHYSICS 3, 9-10 (1983);
Anthony Quinton, Social Objects, 1976 PROC. ARiSTOTELIAN SOC'Y 1, 8).
65. Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND.
L.J. 473, 491-92 (2006) (discussing our linguistic tendency to attribute culpable intent
to entities and arguing that "[w]orking out ground rules for such talk is unnecessary"
because the "words themselves show that we understand entities to exist independent of
individual actors and to be responsible"). But see Phillips, supra note 28, at 1105-06
(responding that these linguistic points do not necessarily prove the corporation's real
existence outside of thought and language). However, there is the possibility that if
"language continually treats corporations as real entities, presumably they are real
entities under the only available test of reality." Id. at 1106 n.243.
66. See Mark M. Hager, Bodies Politics: The Progressive History of
Organizational "Real Entity" Theory, 50 U. PITT. L. REv 575, 580 (1989).
67. See Covington & Lexington Tpk. Rd. Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 592
(1896) ("It is now settled that corporations are persons within the meaning of the
constitutional provisions forbidding the deprivation of property without due process of
law, as well as a denial of the equal protection of the laws.").
68. For example, the Supreme Court has held that corporations are entitled to
protections from unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment, see Hale v.
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906), protection from double jeopardy under the Fifth
Amendment, see United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977), free
speech rights under the First Amendment, see First Nat 7 Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765 (1978), and right to trial by jury under the Seventh Amendment, see Ross v.
Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 542 (1970). See generally Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the
Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of Rights, 41 HASTTNGS L.J. 577 (1990)
(discussing Supreme Court jurisprudence for corporate guarantees under the Bill of
Rights).
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language similar to that used to protect the liberty rights of individual
human beings.69 Under this approach, corporations should be viewed as
private institutions, rather than public ones, and should be free from
heavy state regulation of corporate activity. 70  The corporation is a
product of private entrepreneurial initiative and natural market ten-
dencies toward economic consolidation. It is not a creature of the state
and thus is not beholden to the state for its existence or operations.
On the other hand, a slightly different interpretation of the real
entity theory implies a more public-oriented view of corporations. If the
corporation is a real person in society, it should have the same sorts of
moral and social responsibilities that individuals have. 7' As a citizen of
a larger community, it enjoys certain rights and privileges, but it should
also bear the corresponding duties of a citizen "to be sensitive to the
impact of its activities on others, including not just its investors, but also
employees, creditors, consumers, and the larger society in which it
operates. '' 72 Big business is not just a matter of private concern because
everything it does is bound to affect the public in significant ways.
7 3
The role of the law is to regulate corporations to use their powers not
merely to maximize profits for their shareholders, but also to benefit
other participants in the corporation and promote the good of the general
public.7 4 This view supports a public law of corporations.
69. See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 236 (1986)
(observing that a corporation does have a reasonable, legitimate, and objective
expectation of privacy within the interior of its covered buildings for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment); United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569
(1977) (observing that the Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy clause protects accused
defendants from the fear of embarrassment, anxiety, and insecurity, and holding that the
clause protects a corporation from further prosecution). However, the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination has been denied to corporations on the
grounds that it is a purely personal right applying only to natural persons. See United
States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698 (1944).
70. See Millon, supra note 12, at 202-03.
71. See Jeffrey Nesteruk & David T. Risser, Conceptions of the Corporation and
Ethical Decision Making in Business, 12 Bus. & PROF. ETHICS J. 73, 77 (1993).
72. Millon, supra note 45, at 48.
73. See Harold J. Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L.J. 105, 111-12
(1916).
74. Millon, supra note 12, at 220. George Deiser stressed the need to regulate real
corporate entities, paying particular attention to businesses' internal and external affairs.
See Deiser, supra note 52, at 309. Early real entity theorists believed that the theory
supported a stronger regulatory environment for corporations and supported greater tort
and criminal liability for corporate persons who violated the law. See Hager, supra note
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The three legal theories (artificial/fiction, aggregate, real/natural
entity) all provide their own unique insights into the legal personhood of
corporations. Courts have used all three theories to support their deci-
sions, sometimes invoking multiple theories in a single case.75 Although
the theories appear to contradict each other at times, each theory plays a
complimentary role in describing a certain aspect of the corporation. As
we shall see, theories from other academic disciplines illuminate ad-
ditional elements of the corporation. The following section explores
various philosophical aspects of the corporate person.
III. PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF THE CORPORATE PERSON
Moral philosophy has much to say about corporate personhood. If
corporations are persons, they may have not only legal rights and duties,
but also moral rights and duties from a philosophical perspective. For
example, if I deliberately poison someone, I am morally responsible for
that act. If a corporation deliberately poisons a community by leaking
toxic chemicals into the groundwater, is the corporation likewise
morally responsible? Moral responsibility means that the person's
action is worthy of praise or blame for the action's consequences, aside
from any legal accountability that may arise from it. 76 "The presence or
absence of corporate moral personhood determines whether corporations
are subject ... to blame for their failure to meet [their moral] obli-
gations."77  The focus is on the moral blameworthiness of the corpo-
ration itself, not the blameworthiness of its individual members. It asks
66, at 587-89, 604-09, 627 (discussing the views of Gierke, Deiser, Laski, and
Maitland).
75. In Hale v. Henkel, for example, the Supreme Court relied on the artificial
person theory to hold that corporations are not entitled to the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. 201 U.S. 43, 70 (1906). The Court stated that "the
corporation is a creature of the State... presumed to be incorporated for the benefit of
the public." Id. at 74. In the same opinion, the Court used the aggregate theory to
decide that corporations are protected by the Fourth Amendment from unreasonable
searches. Id. at 71. The Court stated that a "corporation is, after all, but an association
of individuals under an assumed name and with a distinct legal entity." Id. at 76.
76. Paul B. Thompson, Why Do We Need a Theory of Corporate Responsibility?,
in SHAME, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE CORPORATION 113, 116 (Hugh Curtler ed., 1986).
77. Michael J. Phillips, Corporate Moral Personhood and Three Conceptions of
the Corporation, 2 Bus. ETHICS Q. 435, 436 (1992).
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whether the corporation is a person capable of making moral choices
and distinguishing between what is morally right and wrong.
Society often condemns harmful corporate actions as being im-
moral and inexcusable.7 8 The large scale reach and operations of corpo-
rations today have the potential to inflict tremendous harm on
individuals, the environment, and the international community.
Corporate actions have been implicated in many cases involving
devastating environmental disasters, hazardous and defective products,
employee alienation and discrimination, and occupational diseases.79
This has led some commentators to call the corporation a "pathological
institution" with almost psychopathic traits reflecting its single-minded
interest in profits and its lack of moral concern for others.8° As a philo-
sophical matter, the question whether it is appropriate to hold corpo-
rations morally blameworthy has been difficult to resolve.
A. Arguments Against Corporate Moral Personhood
From one point of view, attributing moral blame to a corporation is
"no wiser than attributing intention and blame to a dagger, a fountain
pen, a Chevrolet, or any other instrumentality of crime."'" It is not the
corporation that has blameworthy intentions and commits blameworthy
acts, but the individuals in the corporation who engage in the
78. See THOMAS DONALDSON, CORPORATIONS AND MORALITY 1-2 (1982).
Donaldson discusses the case of a corporation in Japan that was forced by the courts to
pay massive damages for dumping poison in the ocean. The poison triggered crippling
birth defects in local communities. The corporation, however, had broken no laws
because the dumping levels fell within accepted ranges under Japanese regulations. The
verdict against the corporation nonetheless "expresse[d] the common intuition that
corporations have a moral, and not merely legal, character." Id. at 2. We have a ten-
dency to ascribe moral responsibility to many collective groups, such as nations, towns,
clubs, and teams. See D.E. Cooper, Collective Responsibility, 43 PHIL. 258, 258 (1968).
79. Some argue that the profit-making dynamic of the corporation causes it to dan-
gerously minimize, if not ignore, many of the concerns of the flesh-and-blood
individuals who populate the world in which it operates. See JOEL BAKAN, THE
CORPORATION: THE PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF PROFIT AND POWER 71 (2004)
(describing the views of Robert Monks, author of THE EMPEROR'S NIGHTINGALE:
RESTORING THE INTEGRITY OF THE CORPORATION IN THE AGE OF SHAREHOLDER
ACTIVISM (1998)).
80. See BAKAN, supra note 79, at 1-2, 56-57. But see Ian B. Lee, Is There a Cure
for Corporate "Psychopathy"?, 42 AM. Bus. L.J. 65, 68-73 (2005).
81. Albert W. Alschuler, Ancient Law and the Punishment of Corporations: Of
Frankpledge and Deodand, 71 B.U. L. REv. 307, 313 (1991).
2009
120 FORDHAMJOURNAL Vol. XV
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW
wrongdoing.82 Therefore, only the individuals, not the corporation, may
be regarded as moral persons who are morally accountable for their
actions. Moral personhood requires a certain level of autonomy: moral
responsibility for an act can be attributed only to the person who
originated the act in his own body, a body over which he or she has
direct autonomous control. 83 Since corporate action never originates in
a body belonging to the corporation, but in the bodies of human beings
who directly control their own actions, corporations do not originate acts
in the manner required for moral responsibility to apply. Therefore, it is
inappropriate to blame or punish a corporation for acts brought about
wholly by bodily movements that are under the autonomous control of
agents other than itself. 84
The same reasoning applies to the element of corporate
intentionality. Moral responsibility requires that a person's actions be
intentional, but corporations are incapable of having their own intentions
because they do not have minds; rather, their intentions are really just
the intentions of their human members.85 It is inappropriate to speak of
the goals and intentions of an organization; rather, we should speak of
the goals and intentionsfor the organization of various individual human
constituents.86 Drawing upon the same principles of individualism
82. See Jan E. Garrett, Unredistributable Corporate Moral Responsibility, 8 J. Bus.
ETHICS 535, 539-544 (1989) (rejecting the theory that corporations can be morally
responsible and criticizing the idea that corporate responsibility cannot be redistributed
to the individuals involved); see also WERHANE, supra note 38, at 39.
83. See Velasquez, supra note 15, at 7. The importance of the body exists in many
philosophical conceptions of personhood. See, e.g., THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE BODY:
REJECTIONS OF CARTESIAN DUALISM (Stuart F. Spicker ed., 1970) (collecting several
essays that discuss the philosophical conception of the body as it relates to personhood).
84. Elizabeth Wolgast calls this a state of "fractured autonomy" and concludes that,
in these circumstances, "it is theoretically impossible for one person to take
responsibility for actions done by another." ELIZABETH WOLGAST, ETHICS OF AN
ARTIFICIAL PERSON: LOST RESPONSIBILITY IN PROFESSIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS 64-65
(1992). If this paradigm is correct, "it means that an artificial person cannot act fully
and morally by definition." Id.; see also Velasquez, supra note 15, at 7 (arguing that
corporations cannot be morally responsible for the actions of its agents).
85. See Larry May, Vicarious Agency and Corporate Responsibility, 43 PHIL.
STUD. 69, 71 (1983); see also Velasquez, supra note 15, at 8-9 (discussing the inability
of corporations to have their own intentions).
86. Christopher McMahon, The Ontological and Moral Status of Organizations, 5
Bus. ETHICS Q. 541, 545 (1995) (describing a portion of the views of Michael Keeley).
Michael Keeley argues that "organizations have no intentions or goals at all." Michael
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underlying the aggregate theory of corporate personhood in the legal
realm, this philosophy concludes that any good or evil that corporations
do essentially comes down to the actions and intentions of the
individuals within the corporation.
Some philosophers argue that even if we could prove corporations
can have their own intentions, such intentionality is only a necessary,
not a sufficient, condition for moral personhood. The essential com-
ponent of moral responsibility that corporations lack is the capacity to
feel emotion.87 Human beings feel pain, suffer pangs of conscience, and
experience moral blame, shame, and anguish due to their actions.
Corporations, however, do not have a heart or soul and lack the ability to
empathize with others who are affected by corporate acts. Thus, without
a conscience, corporations cannot be regarded as morally responsible
persons.88
A related philosophical argument is that corporations are simply not
the types of entities that can be categorized as moral persons because of
their own structural constraints. Philosopher John Ladd believes cor-
porate organizations are more "like machines," than persons, and "it
would be a category mistake to expect a machine to comply with the
principles of morality." 89 This is because formal organizations like cor-
porations must act exclusively to maximize the achievement of a
specified set of goals, e.g., profit. That is how they are structured and
that is how they are to be evaluated. "[A]ny considerations that are not
related to the aims or goals of the organization are automatically
Keeley, Organizations as Non-Persons, 15 J. VALUE INQUIRY 149, 149 (1981). This
does not mean that one cannot make moral judgments about corporations as social
systems. See id. at 154.
87. See Richard T. DeGeorge, Corporations and Morality, in SHAME,
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE CORPORATION, supra note 76, at 57, 62; Rita C. Manning,
Corporate Responsibility and Corporate Personhood, 3 J. Bus. ETHICS 77, 80 (1984).
88. See Thomas Donaldson, Personalizing Corporate Ontology: The French Way,
in SHAME, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE CORPORATION, supra note 76, at 99, 109-10
(arguing that a creature can be rational and intentional, but without a heart or the ability
to sympathize with others, it cannot be a moral person); Larry May, Negligence and
Corporate Criminality, in SHAME, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE CORPORATION, supra note
76, at 137, 152-56 (arguing that the corporation does not have a conscience which is
distinct from its members' consciences). Some theorists have argued that emotion and
arousal level is integral to ethical decision-making even for individual human beings.
See Alice Gaudine & Linda Thorne, Emotion and Ethical Decision-Making in
Organizations, 31 J. Bus. ETHICS 175, 179-84 (2001).
89. John Ladd, Morality and the Ideal of Rationality in Formal Organizations, 54
MOIST 488, 500 (1970).
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excluded as irrelevant to the organizational decision-making process." 90
Like a machine, a corporation is unable to understand the language of
morality and cannot take into account moral considerations in its
decision-making. This theory admonishes us not to expect corporations
or their official human representatives "to be honest, courageous, con-
siderate, sympathetic, or to have any kind of moral integrity. Such
concepts are not in the vocabulary, so to speak, of the organizational
language-game."9' In fact, acts such as "[s]ecrecy, espionage and
deception do not make organizational action wrong; rather they are
right, proper and, indeed, rational, if they serve the objectives of the
organization." 92
The difficulty that many moral philosophers, including John Ladd,
seem to have with the prospect of granting corporations moral
personhood status is that, by doing so, corporations will have not only
moral responsibilities but also moral rights. 93 Even if we would like to
impose duties on corporations to act morally, we feel uncomfortable
with the idea that corporations would then, in turn, have moral rights to
be treated and respected as persons. One way of grappling with this
dilemma is to invoke the Kantian moral philosophical distinction
between means and ends. According to Kant, all human beings are ends
in themselves and should always be treated as such, never as means to
another end.94 In contrast, corporations are human creations that are
90. Id. at 496.
91. Id. at 499. Thus, corporations seem to be logically locked into selfishness by
virtue of their structure as formal organizations. See McMahon, supra note 86, at 551.
92. Ladd, supra note 89, at 500. John Ladd does believe that a corporation can
incorporate moral considerations into its goal set, but these would simply be limiting
conditions on corporate action, not an authentic use of moral language. See Thompson,
supra note 76, at 131. Some scholars rely heavily on this philosophy to argue that cor-
porations should not be treated as persons for criminal law purposes. See Martin
Benjamin & Daniel A. Bronstein, Moral and Criminal Responsibility and Corporate
Persons, in CORPORATIONS AND SOCIETY, supra note 30, at 277, 277-79.
93. See, e.g., Keeley, supra note 86, at 154 (fearing that "the moral-person
approach, while assigning responsibilities to organizations, at the same time assigns
them inordinate rights to pursue organizational welfare"); Ladd, supra note 89, at 508
(arguing that because corporations "are not moral persons, and have no moral
responsibilities, they have no moral rights").
94. Immanuel Kant's moral theory of autonomy gave rise to his well-known
formulation of the categorical imperative: "Act in such a way that you treat humanity,
whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an
end and never simply as a means." IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE
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formed as means to achieve the ends of those human beings who choose
to participate in the corporate enterprise. 95 If corporations have the
same moral standing as natural persons, then corporations are entitled to
the same moral rights, in particular, the right to be treated as an end in
itself. Many moral philosophers denounce that result because, among
other problems, it leads to bizarre conclusions.96 For example, the
involuntary dissolution of a corporation would be comparable to murder,
and the voluntary merger of one company into another would be a form
of suicide. 97 To avoid this result, theorists like John Ladd argue that
moral personhood, with its concomitant moral rights and
responsibilities, should not extend to corporations. Instead, corporations
should be viewed as creations, or machines, serving solely as means to
achieve human ends, and their moral responsibility should be exhausted
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 36 (James W. Ellington trans., 1981). See generally HARDY
E. JONES, KANT'S PRINCIPLE OF PERSONALITY 15-26 (1971); RALPH C.S. WALKER,
KANT: THE ARGUMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHERS 151-59 (1982).
95. See John Ladd, Persons and Responsibility: Ethical Concepts and Impertinent
Analogies, in SHAME, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE CORPORATION, supra note 76, at 77,
95. In Kantian terms, organizations do not hold the same elevated status that
individuals do: "While the Kantian notion of individual autonomy is closely linked to
the perception of individuals as ends, formal organizations exist only as means. As
such they are not equal members in the Kantian kingdom of ends, and they do not
deserve or admit of the special kind of respect that gives rise to the individual's
[autonomy rights]." DAN-COHEN, supra note 56, at 61.
96. See Roger F. Gibson, Jr., Corporations, Persons, and Moral Responsibility, 21
J. THOUGHT 17, 24 (1986) (noting with dismay that if corporations are admitted into the
moral community, it "would have the effect of assigning to corporations all of the
rights, privileges, duties, and obligations accorded biological person[s]"); Keeley, supra
note 86, at 154 (warning that by giving corporations moral personhood status, "we may
give away too much in the way of corporate rights to gain too little in the way of
corporate accountability"). David Ozar argues that corporations do not have moral
rights because corporations are purely conventional creatures that are created by
continued acts of acceptance of relevant social rules. See David T. Ozar, Do
Corporations Have Moral Rights, 4 J. Bus. ETHICS 277, 280 (1985).
97. See Ladd, supra note 95, at 86 (rhetorically asking, "If a corporation is dis-
solved or incorporated into another one, is that a denial of its right to life? Has the
corporation been murdered?"); McMahon, supra note 86, at 549 ("An organization can
divide into two or more organizations, or two or more can merge into one. Are we to
regard such processes as contrary to the survival interest of the organizations that cease
to exist as a result, or not?"); Raymond S. Pfeiffer, The Meaning and Justification of
Collective Moral Responsibility, 2 PUB. AFF. Q. 69, 75 (1988) ("It is one thing to be told
that a corporation should not be dissolved because jobs would be lost. But it is quite
another to advocate the moral sanctity of a corporate internal decision structure.").
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by their legal responsibility.
98
However, an alternative, more nuanced approach may be to say that
corporations are moral actors for purposes of having moral respon-
sibilities, but are not full-fledged moral persons entitling them to
exercise moral rights. 99 Because corporations do not have the same
standing as autonomous persons in the Kantian kingdom of ends, they
cannot claim full moral personhood status, and we can treat them as
moral subjects for some purposes, but not for others.' 00
B. Arguments in Favor of Corporate Moral Personhood
To the extent that intentionality and the ability to act are important
components of moral personhood, some philosophers believe the corpo-
ration possesses both. In many cases, the acts and intentions of a corpo-
ration simply cannot be attributed to those of its individual human
members. 101 To be sure, a corporation is dependent on human persons
to carry out its actions, but the collective nature of the corporation can
translate individual actions into corporate ones. 102
98. See DeGeorge, supra note 87, at 60-61; R.E. Ewin, The Moral Status of the
Corporation, 10 J. Bus. ETHICs 749, 749 (1991).
99. There may be different ways to arrive at this conclusion. Patricia Werhane
argues that corporations are "secondary moral agents," not full persons, and therefore
lack the same rights that individuals do. See WERHANE, supra note 38, at 57-62. From
an autonomy perspective, Meir Dan-Cohen argues that organizations cannot make the
same claims or have the same rights as individuals because corporations are more like
intelligent machines. DAN-COHEN, supra note 56, at 57, 62. Richard DeGeorge makes
the distinction between moral actors and moral persons and argues that as creatures of
law, corporations have no independent status or claim to a certain kind of treatment
based on their moral status, even though they do have moral responsibilities. See
DeGeorge, supra note 87, at 63-64, 70-71.
100. One may object to this approach as being an inconsistent, all too convenient
method of avoiding the consequences of viewing corporations as moral persons. See,
e.g., W. Michael Hoffman & Robert E. Frederick, Corporate Moral Responsibility: A
Reply to Professor Gibson, 21 J. THOUGHT 27, 32 (1986) (arguing that "[i]f corpo-
rations are moral persons, or at least like them in the morally relevant aspects, then we
must treat them as such regardless of the disadvantages").
101. See David T. Risser, Power and Collective Responsibility, 9 KINESIs 23, 23, 28
(1978).
102. Certain acts, such as declaring a dividend or agreeing to a merger, are
inherently corporate acts. They cannot be executed solely by individuals, but only by
corporate bodies pursuant to relevant rules and policies. Although each member of the
board of directors has the power to vote in favor of such actions, only the board as a
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It is not always appropriate to limit moral responsibility to the
individual members of the corporation because sometimes immoral
corporate actions are the result of a series or combination of blameless
primary individual actions. No one person is at fault for the harm
caused by the collective corporate act. 0 3 A large corporation's organ-
izational design may not allow individuals in different sections of the
corporation to communicate effectively with one another, making it
difficult for them to foresee the potentially harmful impact of their
combined individual actions. It may be impossible to identify any indi-
vidual wrongdoers when dozens of corporate departments and hundreds
of employees are involved in the entire decision-making process, all
contributing only a finite amount to the final corporate action.10 4 It is a
structural feature of the corporation that allows for a nexus of actions by
its members to ultimately produce harm, a result that can only properly
be attributed to the corporation, not the individuals themselves.'0 5 In
whole can authorize them. The authorization is a corporate action that constitutes more
than the aggregation of all individual actions. See Paul E. Wilson, Barring
Corporations from the Moral Community-The Concept and the Cost, 1 J. Soc. PHIL.
74, 75 (1992) ("[T]he idea that individuals are independently responsible for the
execution of all acts seems to ignore the fact that some acts are public acts
accomplished only through cooperative effort.").
103. See WERHANE, supra note 38, at 56.
104. In such cases, trying to pinpoint individual responsibility is futile:
Large corporations, employing thousands of people and making millions of decisions,
impose impossible burdens on society to isolate and identify a particular individual to
be held responsible where only the last link in the long decision chain is visible. Even
if the entire corporate decision process were exposed to public scrutiny, it might still
be impossible to isolate and identify the guilty person because of the collectivity of
actions that resulted in law violation and the lack of specific intent or direct
knowledge on the part of the thousands of people who may have contributed in some
minuscule sense to that direction.
S. Prakash Sethi, Executive Liability for Corporate Law Violations, 5 L.A. Bus. &
ECON. 10, 15 (1980).
105. LARRY MAY, THE MORALITY OF GROUPS: COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY,
GROUP-BASED HARM, AND CORPORATE RIGHTS 87 (1987); Michael B. Metzger,
Corporate Criminal Liability for Defective Products: Policies, Problems, and
Prospects, 73 GEO. L.J. 1, 57 (1984). There may be situations where different
employees of the corporation each know a certain portion of information, but there is
nothing in the company's internal operating procedures to bring the agents together. If
harm occurs as a result of a corporate act, it may be more reasonable to blame the
corporation rather than the employees who each separately could not have foreseen the
dangers. See Christopher D. Stone, Corporate Vices and Corporate Virtues: Do
Public/Private Distinctions Matter?, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1441, 1490 n.180 (1982).
Manuel Velasquez disagrees. He maintains that in those situations where wrongdoing
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fact, in some corporate structures, the individual might well be said to be
dispensable because certain wrongful corporate acts could persist even if
particular individuals were removed from the system. In those situ-
ations, the corporation should be morally responsible for the policies and
practices that provide the environment in which individual actions are
likely to combine to cause harm. 
106
Some philosophers argue that not only can corporations act in ways
that are distinct from their members' acts, but corporations can also have
their own intentions, i.e., "a deliberate disposition to do something in a
certain manner or to realize a state of affairs." 10 7 Corporate intent, or
will, is not the same as the individual intentions or wills of the corpo-
ration's members.10 8 For example, in the corporate decision-making
process, certain individuals may be asked for their input on discrete,
isolated issues without being informed of how the input will be
incorporated in the big picture. As a result, none of them fully under-
stand the larger implications of their singular contributions. 0 9 It is in-
appropriate in such cases to pinpoint the final intent of the corporation
on specific individuals who each played only a small role in forming the
broader intentionality of the corporation:
[T]he claim that corporate intentions can be nothing but the in-
tentions of individuals does not seem correct .... Human motivation
is complex, and it would be implausible to think that corporate
has occurred but no identifiable human beings knew about or intended that outcome, the
corporate act is simply one for which no one is morally responsible: "it is an
unintentional happening." See Velasquez, supra note 15, at 10.
106. Patricia H. Werhane, Corporate and Individual Moral Responsibility: A Reply
to Jan Garrett, 8 J. Bus. ETHICS 821, 822 (1989); see also Pfeiffer, supra note 97, at 73;
Thompson, supra note 76, at 123. One concern that some commentators have with
placing blame on the corporation is that it may have the tendency to obscure the
blameworthy individuals within the corporation who will escape moral judgment. See
Velasquez, supra note 15, at 15. However, holding a corporation morally responsible
does not preclude individual members from responsibility for their own culpable
conduct as well. The two forms of moral responsibility are not mutually exclusive.
107. WERHANE, supra note 38, at 36.
108. Virginia Held, Corporations, Persons, and Responsibility, in SHAME,
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE CORPORATION, supra note 76, at 161, 171. Of course,
corporate intent, or mens rea, is an important and accepted feature of laws that impose
criminal and civil liability on corporations. See generally V.S. Khanna, Is the Notion of
Corporate Fault a Faulty Notion?: The Case of Corporate Mens Rea, 79 B.U. L. REv.
355 (1999) (discussing corporate mens rea).
109. See DAN-COHEN, supra note 56, at 32-33.
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decisions do reflect the intentions of the members in a completely
reducible way. It is much more believable to think that as a
multitude of persons with varying amounts of power and influence
contribute to a corporate decision, the outcome is certainly shaped in
ways that produce corporate "intentions" quite different from those
that entered into the process. 1 0
The collective nature of the corporation's decision-making system
transforms the individual inputs, making the individual intentions and
actions unrecognizable when the final corporate intention is formulated.
Philosopher Peter French believes it is a corporation's intentionality
that gives it the status of a moral person because intentionality is both a
necessary and sufficient condition for moral personhood."' French
argues that corporate intentionality may be traced to the corporation's
internal decision structure (CID Structure). CID Structures have two
elements: (1) an organizational flowchart delineating the various levels
within the corporate hierarchy and (2) corporate rules that are usually
manifested in corporate policy. 1 2 Before the corporation acts, it must
first contemplate that action and determine whether it is appropriate and
feasible. The CID Structure receives input from various individuals
within the corporate hierarchy, evaluates that information in light of
basic corporate policies, and engages in a decision-making and ratifi-
cation process. "When operative and properly activated, the CID
Structure accomplishes a subordination and synthesis of the intentions
and acts of various biological persons into a corporate decision."' 3
Corporate acts may be done for corporate reasons that are qualitatively
different from the individual reasons component members may have for
doing what they do. The CID Structure provides the corporation with
110. Held, supra note 108, at 171-72. To illustrate her point, Virginia Held
describes a hypothetical case in which a corporation's ultimate intention to proceed
with moving a plant is not the true intention of any of the corporate executives who
collectively made the final decision. See id. at 171. David Risser uses a similar
example to show how each member of a board of directors may have the intention to
directly address a corporate pollution issue, but because they cannot agree on a unified
corporate political position, they compromise and adopt a policy to suppress the
pollution issue, a stance that does not reflect the intention of any of the individual
members. See Risser, supra note 101, at 29-30; see also Thomas W. Smythe, Problems
About Corporate Moral Personhood, 19 J. VALUE INQUIRY 327, 328 (1985).
111. See Peter A. French, The Corporation as a Moral Person, 16 AM. PHIL. Q. 207,
211,215 (1979).
112. See FRENCH, supra note 56, at 41.
113. Id.
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the capacity to act intentionally and to order its behavior."
4
Corporations with CID Structures that facilitate non-programmed, non-
routinized, adaptive decisionmaking meet the conditions of moral
personhood. "5 What this shows, according to French, is that corpo-
rations can be intentional actors and therefore exist as "full-fledged
moral persons" with all the rights, privileges, and duties that such status
implies. 116
An alternative method of establishing corporate moral personhood
is to identify the features belonging to human beings that make them
moral persons, and then project moral responsibility onto corporations if
they display those same features. Kenneth Goodpaster and John
Matthews argue that two essential traits which are rooted in long and
diverse philosophical traditions and which characterize the morally
responsible person are: rationality (the capacity of rational decision-
making) and respect (the awareness of the effects of one's decisions on
others)." '7 Because corporations are capable of gathering information
about the impact of their actions on others and using it to make
decisions, corporations exhibit both rationality and respect and, hence,
can be considered moral persons." 8 In fact, in light of the bounded
rationality of human reasoning, corporations may be even more capable
than human beings of acting in a purposeful, rational, and calculating
manner, incorporating multiple concerns in their decision-making
processes. This proposition has led one commentator to argue that cor-
porations "can and should have access to practical and theoretical
knowledge which dwarfs that of individuals," and therefore corporations
114. See id. at 44.
115. See Peter A. French, Principles of Responsibility, Shame, and the Corporation,
in SHAME, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE CORPORATION, supra note 76, at 17, 37.
116. See French, supra note 111, at 207. For a critique of French's views on
corporate intentionality and moral personhood, see DONALDSON, supra note 78, at 20-
23; MAY, supra note 105, at 69-72. But see Christopher Meyers, The Corporation, Its
Members, and Moral Accountability, 3 Bus. & PROF. ETHics J. 33, 38 (1983) (relying
on French's "perceptive and plausible" account of the CID Structure); Thompson, supra
note 76, at 133 (finding French's theory "logically coherent" and "a good way to
determine the ontological standing of corporat[ions]").
117. See Kenneth E. Goodpaster & John B. Matthews, Jr., Can a Corporation Have
a Conscience?, HARV. Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1982, at 132, 134.
118. Id. at 135-36. The authors respond to nine separate objections to treating a
corporation as a morally responsible person. Id. at 139-41. For a critique of their
views, see Gibson, supra note 96, at 17-19.
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"must have, in addition to good intentions, superhuman intelligence." " 9
Under this view, corporations should be held to even higher moral
standards than human beings when corporations fail to utilize such
intelligence in morally appropriate ways.
C. Comments
The corporate moral personhood question has important normative
implications. Those who argue in favor of moral personhood believe
corporations should have moral obligations that go beyond the demands
of both the law and market forces. Corporate activity has the capacity to
improve as well as damage human life. If responsibility is typically tied
to capacity, we are inclined to assign moral responsibility to corpo-
rations for the good and bad outcomes they are capable of producing.
We ask, at the very least, that corporations "do no unjustifiable harm."'' 20
We expect corporate activity to produce benefits in our society, but not
at too high a cost to our own personal and societal welfare.
I believe many of those who argue against corporate moral
personhood hold the same normative outlook on corporate activity, but
they fear the consequences of concluding that corporations are moral
persons. They worry that granting corporations personhood status will
somehow diminish the status of human persons and eclipse individual
rights when juxtaposed against larger-than-human corporate persons. 121
They would prefer to reject the concept of corporate moral personhood
altogether to avoid the risk of giving so much to corporations that
individuals end up having less. However, it is not entirely clear that
viewing corporations as moral persons would necessarily have that
effect.
Whether or not corporations are metaphysical moral persons, the
impact they have on society creates a tendency to feel that corporations
must be controlled to comply with the demands of morality. We may
not believe a vicious dog has a moral responsibility to refrain from
attacking a child, but we must nonetheless control its behavior because
119. DONALDSON, supra note 78, at 125.
120. DeGeorge, supra note 87, at 69.
121. See, e.g., WERHANE, supra note 38, at 40 ("If a corporation is a moral person,
what is the status of employee-persons? Are they lesser moral persons?"); Velasquez,
supra note 15, at 15 (expressing concern that we may be "tempted to look upon the cor-
poration as a larger-than-human person whose ends and well-being are more important
than those of its members").
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of the dangers its actions pose to others. If we focus primarily on the
social impact of corporate activity, it may make little difference how we
define the corporation either legally or morally. Instead, we could work
on shaping corporate behavior to conform with our notions of what is
just. We may ultimately decide that we are all better off concluding that
corporations are moral persons with moral obligations, even if we can-
not prove it in purely philosophical terms.
The philosophical discussion of corporate personhood tends to
press hard on analogies to individual personhood, but we may be
missing something by relying so heavily on standards of individual
moral responsibility. It might be more helpful to analyze corporations as
unique entities with functions and features that cannot be equated with
those of human individuals. Rather than employing the same standards
of moral personhood and responsibility that apply to individuals, we
could consider devising criteria of moral personhood and responsibility
that are specifically tailored to corporations. 122 "Instead of assuming
that a single concept of moral agency underlies both human and
corporations, why not consider the prospect of a double concept? Why
not consider the possibility that both human and corporation qualify as
moral agents, and yet refuse to reduce each agency to a common
denominator?"' 123  Such an approach would accept the distinct and
special nature of the corporation as a person without diminishing indi-
vidual personhood with its accompanying rights and duties.
Beyond legal and philosophical theories of corporate personhood,
we can gain even greater understanding of the uniqueness of the cor-
porate person from the perspectives of organizational theory,
psychology, and sociology. As the following section explains, these so-
cial science disciplines offer important insights into the nature of the
corporation, its role in society, and its powerful influence on human
thought and behavior.
122. See Held, supra note 108, at 168. Virginia Held believes that "we need to
recognize two different kinds of responsibility: corporate and personal." Id.; see also
Cooper, supra note 78, at 263 (noting that we should "cease to assume that the
standards used for judging individuals should be the same as those we use for judging
collectives").
123. Donaldson, supra note 88, at 111.
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IV. ORGANIZATIONAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND SOCIOLOGICAL
DIMENSIONS OF THE CORPORATE PERSON
A. Organization Theory and Psychology
Organizational theory is concerned with the structure and processes
of organizations. 124 It starts with the premise that organizations are not
like people, and a "preoccupation with natural persons [can] get in the
way of a fuller understanding of organizational reality."'' 25  When a
group of individuals, in a cooperative effort to achieve specified goals,
join together to form an organization, "there is created something new in
the world that is... different in quantity and quality from anything pres-
ent in the sum of the efforts of the [individuals]" who constituted it. 126
Organizations produce and affect real behavior that would not otherwise
exist without the organization.
There are dozens of approaches in organizational theory to define
what the organization is and how it functions. 1 27 What binds the various
lines of thought together is the object of study-the large complex
organization-which is believed to have several essential characteristics
making it a unified and distinctive phenomenon. These characteristics
include structure, permanence, decision-making, large size, formality,
complexity, functionality, and goal orientation. 128
124. HENRY L. TosI, THEORIES OF ORGANIZATION 1-2 (2d ed. 1984). In organization
theory, the main focus of analysis is the organization and not the individuals within it.
Id. at 2, 13. See generally MARY J. HATCH & ANN L. CUNLIFFE, ORGANIZATION
THEORY: MODERN, SYMBOLIC, AND POSTMODERN PERSPECTIVES (2006).
125. See Michael B. Metzger & Dan R. Dalton, Seeing the Elephant: An
Organizational Perspective on Corporate Moral Agency, 33 AM. Bus. L.J. 489, 492
(1996).
126. Chester Barnard, The Functions of the Executive, in TOSi, supra note 124, at
62, 65.
127. For example, an organization can be seen as a cultural product, an independent
agency, a system of structures and functions, an exchange agent with environment, a
structure in action over time, a processing system, an input-output system, or a structure
of subgroups. TOSI, supra note 124, at 17; see also Jeffrey Pfeffer, Organizations and
Organization Theory, in I THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: THEORY AND
METHOD 379, 379 (Gardner Lindzey & Eliot Aronson eds., 1985) (noting the broad
interdisciplinary nature of organization theory).
128. See DAN-COHEN, supra note 56, at 31-38 (discussing eight clusters of
organizational properties). Henry Tosi identifies a related set of essential characteristics
that includes large size, formalization, rationality, hierarchical structure, and
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The field of organizational behavior examines individual and group
behavior within organizations from a psychological standpoint. 129  It
demonstrates the ways corporate persons affect the thoughts, attitudes,
and behavior of natural persons. Situational forces can lead people to
act differently in group settings than they would as solitary individuals.
For example, the psychological tendency called "risky shift" occurs
when people in groups, who must reach a consensus on an appropriate
level of risk for a given situation, typically select a risk level that is
higher than their own individual risk tolerance.130 Collective corporate
decisions often reflect an acceptance of risk most people would regard
as unacceptable had they been asked to make the decision alone.
"Groupthink" is the process by which group members desire so strongly
to conform to a group mode of thinking, it overrides their ability to
realistically evaluate alternative courses of action.' 31 Group loyalty can
lead members to continue with certain policies, even when those policies
are obviously working out badly and have unintended consequences that
disturb the conscience of each member. 132 Individuals can internalize
group goals and norms through a process of socialization that pressures
dissenting members to conform.' 33 The group takes on an esprit de
specialization. See Tosi, supra note 124, at 2-3.
129. For a good discussion of multiple theories of organizational behavior, see
generally JOHN B. MINER, ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR: FOUNDATIONS, THEORIES, AND
ANALYSIS (2002).
130. See ROBERT S. FELDMAN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 466 (1995); SHELLEY E.
TAYLOR ET AL., SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 293-94 (9th ed. 1997).
131. IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS
AND FIASCOS 9 (1982).
132. Id. at 11. In fact, group members may have a tendency to become overly
optimistic and disregard facts that signal danger. See id. at 174. The group setting only
heightens the psychological biases that already exist in individuals. I have discussed
elsewhere the human tendency toward excessive optimism and confirmation biases
motivating individuals to resist evidence their prior decisions may have been wrong.
See Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote:
Toward a More Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. REV.
139, 168-76 (2006).
133. See JANIS, supra note 131, at 175. Observers of organizational behavior often
comment on the role of organizational cultures in socializing members to adopt
organizational perspectives. See, e.g., ANTHONY DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY 233-36
(1967); GARY JOHNS, ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR: UNDERSTANDING LIFE AT WORK
288-91 (1983); JOE KELLY, ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOUR: AN ExISTENTIAL-SYSTEMS
APPROACH 344-51 (rev. ed. 1974); JOHN P. KOTTER & JAMES L. HESKET-r, CORPORATE
CULTURE AND PERFORMANCE 7 (1992); ROBERT PRESTHUS, THE ORGANIZATIONAL
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corps, or force of its own. People are changed and affected by being in
groups, whether they are conscious of it or not. Thus, the organizational
structure has a way of absorbing individual attitudes and creating a
collective corporate perspective in their place.
These psychological dimensions of organizational behavior lend
support to the idea that the corporation is not the sum total of the
individuals in the organization, but rather, an entity supplying an
environment that affects the behavior of its individual members in very
real and powerful ways. How can the corporate environment exert such
influence? Much of it comes from the culture and character of the
corporation.
B. Corporate Culture
At the most fundamental level, the culture of the corporation plays
a significant role in influencing individuals within the organization.
Corporate culture is "the body of shared beliefs, values, expectations,
and norms of behavior that shape life in the organization.' ' 13 4  The
cultural values and principles of the corporation are conveyed by way of
examples, from which members of the organization learn what sorts of
behavior and attitudes are permitted and rewarded. A certain corporate
ethos develops, an "abstract and intangible character" that is "separate
from the substance of what [the corporation] actually does." '135 It per-
SOCIETY 7-8, 16 (1962); PHILIP SELZNICK, LEADERSHIP IN ADMINISTRATION: A
SOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION 17-18 (1957).
134. EDWIN HARTMAN, ORGANIZATIONAL ETHICS AND THE GOOD LIFE 149 (1996).
The popular business management literature is filled with guidebooks that describe
corporate culture and provide managers with tips on fostering successful cultures. See,
e.g., TERRENCE E. DEAL & ALLAN A. KENNEDY, CORPORATE CULTURES: THE RITES AND
RITUALS OF CORPORATE LIFE (1982); ROB GOFFEE & GARETH JONES, THE CHARACTER
OF A CORPORATION: How YOUR COMPANY'S CULTURE CAN MAKE OR BREAK YOUR
BUSINESS (1998); JEROME WANT, CORPORATE CULTURE: ILLUMINATING THE BLACK
HOLE (2006). Stanley Davis notes that several other popular terms may be used to
describe corporate "culture," including "being, core, . . . ethos, identity, ideology,
manner, patterns, philosophy, purpose, roots, spirit, style, vision, and way." STANLEY
M. DAVIS, MANAGING CORPORATE CULTURE 1 n.1 (1984). Some authors try to identify
specific traits associated with "excellent" corporate cultures. See, e.g., THOMAS J.
PETERS & ROBERT H. WATERMAN, JR., IN SEARCH OF EXCELLENCE: LESSONS FROM
AMERICA'S BEST-RUN COMPANIES 13-16 (1982) (listing eight attributes of highly
regarded companies).
135. See Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate
Criminal Liability, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095, 1123 (1991). Courts also have recognized
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meates the organization and can remain the same for years even though
some or all of the individual members change. For example, researchers
have found that certain corporations display consistently ethical or
unethical conduct over time, reflecting the persistence of particular
corporate cultures fostering such behavior. '36
In organizations with strong corporate cultures, the culture is
integrated into the lives of the members and it becomes difficult to see
oneself apart from it. There are psychological and sociological dimen-
sions to this integration: "[G]roups are not only external features of the
world that people encounter and interact with, . . . they are also inter-
nalized so that they contribute to a person's sense of self Groups define
who we are, what we see, what we think and what we do."' 137 People
naturally develop a sense of loyalty to groups, identifying with the goals
and values of the group and making them their own. 31 Strong cultures
the existence of corporate culture. See, e.g., Dunkin' Donuts Mid-Atlantic Distrib. Ctr.,
Inc. v. NLRB, 363 F.3d 437, 442 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (finding corporate "anti-union
conduct so pervasive as to have created a corporate culture of lawlessness") (citation
omitted).
136. See MARSHALL B. CLINARD & PETER C. YEAGER, CORPORATE CRIME 58-60
(1980) (summarizing research). Research showed that certain corporations were
"multiple violators," with a measurable percentage of violating corporations committing
a disproportionate share of infractions. See id. at 116-19. One longitudinal study
revealed that certain corporations acted as criminal "recidivists," exhibiting chronic
violations of the law even after convictions and punishment. See id. at 126-27.
Researchers concluded that some corporations "have developed a corporate atmosphere
favorable to unethical and illegal behavior." Id. at 117. Tamar Frankel describes
corporate culture as a "social habit" and notes that certain corporate behaviors, "like old
habits," can persist in spite of changes in management and personnel. Tamar Frankel,
Using the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to Reward Honest Corporations, 62 Bus. LAW. 161, 162-
65 (2006).
137. See S. ALEXANDER HASLAM, PSYCHOLOGY IN ORGANIZATIONS: THE SOCIAL
IDENTITY APPROACH 22 (2001); see also ROBERT C. SOLOMON, ETHICS AND
EXCELLENCE: COOPERATION AND INTEGRITY IN BusINESS 161 (1992) ("W]hat we think
of ourselves and how we behave is molded through and through by the various groups
and institutions of which we have been members, beginning with our family and our
schools and culminating, for millions of people, in the corporation."). Robert Solomon
argues that it is wrong to distinguish between "who I really am" and "the person I am
on the job" because "corporate role identity is genuine identity," and it arises naturally
out of the integration of our personal values and corporate values. SOLOMON, supra, at
161.
138. See John M. Darley, The Cognitive and Social Psychology of Contagious
Organizational Corruption, 70 BROOK. L. REv. 1177, 1191 (2005) ("When an
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can actually help determine what makes one happy and what kind of
person one wants to be, in part, by defining for the person what counts
as success. In Frankfurtian terms, cultures can affect one's second-order
desires, causing one not only to want certain things, but also to want to
want them, i.e., to desire to be the type of person who values these
things. 139  For example, in a corporate culture that values com-
petitiveness, one not only wants to win, but also wants to change one's
personality to be the sort of person who genuinely values winning.
140
To the extent individuals' principles are shaped by their corporate
environment, they are, in some sense, creatures of the corporation. 1
41
From a moral perspective, corporate cultures can influence
individual moral choices. Research has shown that "individual charac-
teristics alone are insufficient to explain moral and ethical behavior."
1 42
Corporate culture affects the degree to which an individual can spot an
ethical issue or interpret a given situation as raising moral concerns. 
143
If the social consensus within the organization indicates that certain
types of questionable acts are acceptable or expected, individuals may
not see the behavior as being ethically problematic at all. It is "the
individual's perception of social consensus within that individual's
relevant social sphere that is most important in determining whether an
individual will recognize a moral issue.' ' 44 Organizations can induce
individual is a member of a group, in the sense that she is committed to the purposes of
the group and that a group has tasks to do, the task of the individual is to first become a
prototypical member of that group, and then help the group as best she can in reaching
its goals.").
139. See Edwin M. Hartman, The Commons and the Moral Organization, 4 Bus.
ETHICS. Q. 253, 255 (1994). Harry Frankfurt's well-known philosophical theory of the
concept of the person posits that having freedom of will is essential to being a person,
and that one has this freedom of will only when one can have the will one wants to
have, i.e., the capacity for second-order desires. See Harry G. Frankfirt, Freedom of
the Will and the Concept of a Person, 68 J. PHIL. 5, 5-20 (1971); see also DANIEL C.
DENNETr, BRAINSTORMS: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS ON MIND AND PSYCHOLOGY 283-85
(1978) (discussing Frankfurt's theory).
140. See Hartman, supra note 139, at 255.
141. See SOLOMON, supra note 137, at 152.
142. Bart Victor & John B. Cullen, The Organizational Bases of Ethical Work
Climates, 33 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 101, 103 (1988).
143. See James R. Rest, The Major Components of Morality, in MORALITY, MORAL
BEHAVIOR, AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT 24, 24 (William M. Kurtines & Jacob L.
Gewirtz eds., 1984).
144. Kenneth D. Butterfield et al., Moral Awareness in Business Organizations:
Influences of Issue-Related and Social Context Factors, 53 HuM. REL. 981, 990 (2000).
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normally "good" and "ordinary" individuals to temporarily ignore the
moral consequences of their actions and engage in acts that in hindsight
seem astonishingly immoral. 45  In the grip of "groupthink," group
members can come to believe unreservedly in the morality of their group
and disregard the moral ramifications of their actions. 146
Sociologists have identified certain criminogenic or crime-
facilitative corporate systems in which internal cultural factors generate
or encourage criminal activity within the organization. 47  Corporate
cultures with heavy demands to achieve certain profit goals can cause
deviant behavior. 148 The corporate environment presents pressures or
extremely tempting conditions that facilitate the commission of crime by
members of the corporation. 149  Individuals who initially feel uncom-
Ethical decision-making is "very much a social process. If a decision maker perceives
that others in the social environment will see an issue as ethically problematic, she or he
will be more likely to consider the ethical issues involved." Id. at 1001.
145. See John M. Darley, How Organizations Socialize Individuals into Evildoing,
in CODES OF CONDUCT: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUSINESS ETHICS 13, 13-14
(David M. Messick & Ann E. Tenbrunsel eds., 1996). John Darley notes that
individual-level psychology is largely irrelevant to "organizational pathology," which
often produces evil actions by individuals in organizations. Id. at 41. A more socio-
logical description is needed to explain "how human institutions can purposely move or
accidentally lurch toward causing these actions, somehow neutralizing or suspending or
overriding or replacing the moral scruples of their members." Id.
146. See JANIS, supra note 131, at 174.
147. See Martin L. Needleman & Carolyn Needleman, Organizational Crime: Two
Models of Criminogenesis, 20 Soc. Q. 517, 518 (1979).
148. See CHARLES H. MCCAGHY, DEVIANT BEHAVIOR: CRIME, CONFLICT, AND
INTEREST GROUPS 218 (1976); W. B. Fisse, The Social Policy of Corporate Criminal
Responsibility, 6 ADEL. L. REV. 361, 377 (1977-78); see also LaRue T. Hosmer, The
Institutionalization of Unethical Behavior, 6 J. Bus. ETHICS 439, 439-47 (1987)
(showing how unethical behavior is driven by divisionalized corporate structures and
management styles that cause different sectors to compete against each other to reach
profit goals).
149. See Needleman & Needleman, supra note 147, at 521. Certain corporate
policies may set various quotas and deadlines that place pressures on corporate
managers to do whatever is necessary to maximize profits, including illegal or unethical
behavior. Sears Auto Centers' highly criticized practice of overcharging customers for
unneeded repairs is an example. Sears employees were required to meet minimum
work and sales quotas or face the loss of their jobs. It led them to falsify charges, and
ultimately forty state attorney generals filed claims against Sears for these illegal
practices. See Lynne L. Dallas, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Responsibility of
Corporations and Their Officers and Directors for Corporate Climate: The Psychology
of Enron's Demise, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 39-40 (2003).
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fortable with the system may choose to give in to systemic pressures for
personal or financial reasons, especially when they are instructed by
their supervisors to act in certain ways. 150 Researchers consistently have
found that the behavior of supervisors is a dominant influence on
individuals' ethical behavior because it provides the model for how
subordinates should act in the organization.'51 If organizational goals
are successfully achieved as a result of unlawful conduct, the conduct
tends naturally to be reinforced. In this manner, unlawful behavior
receives additional support from systemic and cultural forces in the
corporation.152 Thus, "at least some criminal behavior usefully may be
viewed not as personal deviance, but rather as a predictable product of
the individual's membership in or contact with certain organizational
systems." 53
Of course, not all individuals will respond in the same manner to
organizational pressures. Recognizing that cultural factors play a role in
the behavior of individuals does not deny the importance of the
interactive relationship between individuals and their environment.
Rather, it highlights the power of the corporate culture to shape and
direct individual behavior in the corporation. 154  These findings nor-
matively imply that moral individual behavior requires the support of the
150. See, e.g, RALPH ESTES, TYRANNY OF THE BOTTOM LINE: WHY CORPORATIONS
MAKE GOOD PEOPLE Do BAD THINGS 158 (1996). A study of newly graduated Harvard
MBAs found that "in many cases, young managers received explicit instructions from
their middle-manager bosses or felt strong organizational pressures to do things that
they believed were sleazy, unethical, or sometimes illegal." Joseph L. Badaracco, Jr. &
Allen P. Webb, Business Ethics: A View from the Trenches, 37 CAL. MGMT. REV. 8, 8
(1995).
151. See James C. Wimbush & Jon M. Shepard, Toward an Understanding of
Ethical Climate: Its Relationship to Ethical Behavior and Supervisory Influence, 13 J.
Bus. ETHICS 637, 642 (1994).
152. See DIANE VAUGHAN, CONTROLLING UNLAWFUL ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR:
SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND CORPORATE MISCONDUCT 61 (1983); see also Barry D.
Baysinger, Organization Theory and the Criminal Liability of Organizations, 71 B.U.
L. REV. 341, 365 (1991).
153. Needleman & Needleman, supra note 147, at 517. The opposite can also be
true: A corporation's culture may do much to cultivate lawful and ethical behavior.
See Tim Barnett & Cheryl Vaicys, The Moderating Effect of Individuals'Perceptions of
Ethical Work Climate on Ethical Judgments and Behavioral Intentions, 27 J. Bus.
ETHICS 351, 351, 360 (2000).
154. See Jeffrey Nesteruk, Legal Persons and'Moral Worlds: Ethical Choices
Within the Corporate Environment, 29 AM. BUS. L.J. 75, 85-90 (1991) (calling
corporations "moral worlds" that influence and structure the moral choices and behavior
of the individuals who inhabit them).
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right sort of organization and that corporations should create cultures in
which people need not be heroes of self-sacrifice to do the right thing. 1
55
"[I]t is inappropriate for organizations to rely totally on individual
integrity to guide behavior... . [Rather], organizations must provide a
context that supports ethical behavior and discourages unethical
behavior."156 The way to build a moral organization is not by ensuring
that all individual members are moral people, but by creating an
environment in which ordinary people will have reason to act morally.
If corporate culture can be viewed as the character or personality of
the corporate person, it not only affects individuals within the corporate
setting, but it also affects how the corporation is perceived by outsiders.
As the next section explains, there is an external sociological dimension
to the corporate person that is an important part of its identity.
C. External Sociological Identity
Corporations have a particular identity and presence in society. As
social entities, they literally dominate the landscape. Places of public
enjoyment like sports stadiums, parks, and concert halls bear corporate
names today, where in times past, such places were often named after
public benefactors or heroic figures.'5 7 Popular culture is filled with
images of specific corporate personalities, largely due to corporations'
own use of "branding" techniques to create unique and attractive
identities for themselves in the public eye. 58  Ronald McDonald, the
Michelin Man, and the Pillsbury Doughboy are easily identifiable cor-
porate symbols. Corporate slogans, such as "Just Do It" for Nike, or
155. HARTMAN, supra note 134, at 68, 72.
156. Linda K. Trevino, Ethical Decision Making in Organizations: A Person-
Situation Interactionist Model, 11 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 601, 614 (1986).
157. Marc Galanter makes this point in his illuminating discussion of the
"corporatization of the law." See Marc Galanter, Planet of the APS: Reflections on the
Scale of Law andIts Users, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 1369, 1398-1400 (2006).
158. The branding industry has become increasingly important as corporations
recognize the value of creating and maintaining successful brand images. The popular
business literature is filled with guidebooks on branding methods. See, e.g., ALINA
WHEELER, DESIGNING BRAND IDENTITY: A COMPLETE GUIDE TO CREATING, BUILDING,
AND MAINTAINING STRONG BRANDS (2006); see also ALYCIA PERRY & DAVID WISNOM
III, BEFORE THE BRAND: CREATING THE UNIQUE DNA OF AN ENDURING BRAND
IDENTITY (2003); BERND SCHMITT & ALEX SIMONSON, MARKETING AESTHETICS: THE
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT OF BRANDS, IDENTITY, AND IMAGE (1997); PAUL TEMPORAL,
ADVANCED BRAND MANAGEMENT: FROM VISION TO VALUATION (2002).
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"Are you in good hands?" for Allstate Insurance, help to form
corporations' external personality. These symbols and slogans have a
way of personifying and linking the corporation to the public. They do
so by creating intellectual and emotional bonds with people. 59 Certain
mental impressions are triggered when one hears the names of various
companies: "Disney is fun," "Ben & Jerry's is caring," and "Apple is
innovative." What corporate marketing strategists and public relations
managers recognize is that corporations, as social beings, project a
particular image and have a certain relationship with other members of
society.
If the corporation is considered a member of society, deeper
normative questions arise regarding its role and responsibilities. Aside
from the perennial debate whether corporations should operate ex-
clusively to maximize shareholder profits or should carry broader
corporate social responsibilities,160 we might also question whether
corporations bind our society together by facilitating the fulfillment of
society's beliefs, hopes, and promises. We might want to examine how
159. See BAKAN, supra note 79, at 26; GIEP FRANZEN & MARGOT BOUWMAN, THE
MENTAL WORLD OF BRANDS: MIND, MEMORY AND BRAND SUCCESS 217-30, 297-310
(2001); MARC GOBE, EMOTIONAL BRANDING: THE NEW PARADIGM FOR CONNECTING
BRANDS TO PEOPLE xiii-xxxii (2001).
160. This Article does not attempt to address that debate which has been, and
continues to be, explored effectively by proponents on both sides. For articles sup-
porting broader corporate social responsibilities and criticizing exclusive shareholder
profit-maximization theories, see, for example, Lynne L. Dallas, Working Toward a
New Paradigm, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 36, 36-65 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed.,
1995); Ronald M. Green, Shareholders as Stakeholders: Changing Metaphors of
Corporate Governance, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1409 (1993); Kent Greenfield,
There 's a Forest in Those Trees. Teaching A bout the Role of Corporations in Society,
34 GA. L. REV. 1011 (2000); Lewis D. Solomon & Kathleen J. Collins, Humanistic
Economics: A New Model for the Corporate Social Responsibility Debate, 12 J. CORP.
L. 331 (1987); Christopher D. Stone, Corporate Social Responsibility What It Might
Mean, IfIt Were Really To Matter, 71 IOWA L. REV. 557 (1986). For articles favoring
theories of shareholder primacy and profit maximization, see, for example, Eugene V.
Rostow, To Whom and for What Ends Is Corporate Management Responsible?, in THE
CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY, supra note 45, at 46; Stephen M. Bainbridge, In
Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green,
50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423 (1993); Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities, Firm-Specific
Capital Investments, and the Legal Treatment of Fundamental Corporate Changes,
1989 DuKE L.J. 173; Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is To
Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, § 6, at 32. See generally Symposium,
Corporate Social Responsibility: Paradigm or Paradox?, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1133
(1999).
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the corporation can be utilized to promote the survival and stability of
our modem industrialized society, and whether the corporation's status
as an autonomous social entity may conflict with the goals and needs of
the society in which it functions.' 6 In whatever way these questions are
resolved, we cannot ignore the expectations we have for corporations to
fill multiple social roles in our society: as a source of profitable
investment, as a producer of essential products, as a law-abiding citizen,
as an honest employer, as a responsible manager of environmental re-
sources, as a charitable neighbor, as a fair competitor, and as an
innovative social designer. 162 The fact that corporations can serve these
multiple functions speaks to the complexity of our society today and the
interdependence between corporations and individuals.
This complex social dimension of corporations raises additional
concerns about another aspect of corporate personhood with significant
consequences for society - the political role of corporations. The corpo-
ration is not only a social entity, but also a political institution with
influence and power that, in some ways, masks that of individual
citizens. To what extent must we reckon with the corporate person as a
political being?
V. POLITICAL DIMENSIONS OF THE CORPORATE PERSON
Political theory and philosophy reveal important insights into the
political dimensions of the corporation. In various visions of the polit-
ical state, the corporate person plays contrasting roles. In some contexts,
the corporation is to be feared and restrained. In others, the corporate
person is welcomed and encouraged to thrive.
A. Political Individualism v. Political Pluralism
In one possible image of our political structure, only two main
entities are significant: the government on the one hand, and isolated
individual natural persons on the other. This image comes from a liberal
political individualism that sees no significant social or political role for
161. See DRUCKER, supra note 57, at 13. The fact that corporations have the capac-
ity to affect society dramatically in both beneficial and harmful ways makes these
questions especially important.
162. See STONE, supra note 35, at 231-32.
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organizations as independent entities.163 "In the bipolar political ontol-
ogy of Anglo-American liberalism, between the state and the individual
there is precious little room for metaphysically 'real' intermediate
entities."' 64 To the extent such entities exist, they are viewed either as
creatures and concessions of the state, or as aggregates of their
individual members. 165  They are not regarded as entities in their own
right wielding any political power or serving any political purpose.
This individualistic conception tends to view the state as an all-
powerful entity with a monopoly on the use of coercive force. Deep
concern about the state's potential ability to threaten individual liberties
results in an insistence on establishing laws to protect individual
rights. 166 There is little concern that corporate persons might grow to be
so powerful that they too could have the capacity to violate individual
rights. In fact, to the extent corporations are viewed merely as aggre-
gates of individual human members, corporations are simply place-
holders for their members, and should be protected against the coercive
powers of the state as well. As we have seen, the United State Supreme
Court has previously utilized this aggregate view of corporations in
holding that they are constitutional persons, entitled to the same
protections as natural persons from state deprivations of their
property. 167
In contrast to this political individualist perspective, a political
pluralist vision recognizes the distinctiveness and significance of
organizations in society. 168 Because human beings associate in groups
163. See DAN-COHEN, supra note 56, at 164. Meir Dan-Cohen notes that the works
of such liberal thinkers as Bruce Ackerman, Ronald Dworkin, Robert Nozick, and John
Rawls, do not deal seriously with the role of organizations as separate entities. To the
extent organizations are treated at all, they are subsumed in the category of individuals.
Id. The following discussion owes much to Meir Dan-Cohen's insights.
164. Teemu Ruskola, Conceptualizing Corporations and Kinship: Comparative Law
and Development Theory in a Chinese Perspective, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1599, 1704
(2000).
165. These two conceptions of the corporation are expressed in the artificial person
and aggregate theories of legal personhood. See discussion supra Parts II.A-II.B. These
theories of the corporation are in sharp contrast to the real entity theory which does
count organizations as separate members of society. See Hager, supra note 66, at 612
("The fiction paradigm held that the only 'real' units in political life were individuals on
the one hand and the state itself on the other.").
166. See DAN-COHEN, supra note 56, at 164-65.
167. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text (discussing Santa Clara v. S.
Pac. R.R., Co., 18 F. 385 (C.C.D. Cal. 1883), affd, 118 U.S. 394 (1886)).
168. See Dalia Tsuk, From Pluralism to Individualism: Berle and Means and 20th-
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to pursue their interests and to accomplish coordinated tasks, groups and
organizations are considered important centers of representation and
participation. Society consists of more than just atomistic individuals
and the all-powerful state; organizational entities also populate the
community and are an integral part of society. While recognizing the
significance of organizations, political pluralism projects two opposing
images of the large corporation. The first sees the corporation as a
harmful source of coercive power, the second sees the corporation as a
critical instrument of freedom and democracy.
Under the first view, corporations' vast concentrations of wealth
give them enormous power, and great care must be taken to protect
individuals from the potentially coercive effects of corporate control.
Individuals stand in a vulnerable position vis-A-vis large corporate
entities because "the moment a powerful group [like the corporation]
begins to act toward a common end it produces a capacity for aggression
that individuals can only in the rarest cases combat."' 69 The dangers
associated with abuses of concentrated economic power fuel the concern
that the state is not the only source of control to threaten individuals in
society. Rather, large corporations similarly possess functions and
powers that are traditionally associated with the state, making corpo-
rations comparable to sovereign government-like bureaucracies. 70
Under this political pluralist view, corporations are "not only consti-
tutive elements of the modem state, but also centers of political and
economic power equivalent to the power of the state."' 7 1  Individuals
Century American Legal Thought, 30 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 179, 189-91 (2005)
(discussing theories of political pluralism).
169. Deiser, supra note 52, at 302. The corporation with its large-scale operations is
believed to create incomparable "dangers to life and limb because 'in its methods of
operation, it tends to be less careful of human life' than smaller-scale enterprise."
Hager, supra note 66, at 608 (quoting Laski, supra note 73, at 124).
170. Earl Latham, The Body Politic of the Corporation, in CORPORATION IN
MODERN SOCIETY, supra note 45, at 218, 218 (describing large corporations "as...
system[s] of private government" that "rival the sovereignty of the state itself'); Arthur
S. Miller, Corporations and Our Two Constitutions, in CORPORATIONS AND SOCIETY,
supra note 30, at 241, 242 (suggesting that corporations' "power and influence, both
externally in the national political order and internally in the so-called corporate
community, make them a true form of governance"); Michael Robertson, Property and
Ideology, 8 CANADIAN J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE 275, 281 (1995) (arguing that corporate
power is more like governmental power and that it is misleading to view corporations
merely as private property).
171. Tsuk, supra note 168, at 181; see also Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Essential
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arguably can be victims of corporate oppression as easily as victims of
state oppression. 72 Their basic rights must be as scrupulously protected
from invasion by private corporations as they are from invasion by
public government. Indeed, it has been suggested that the constitutional
guarantees of the Bill of Rights should be extended to shield individuals
from corporate power. 173
Even deeper suspicion of corporate power arises when corporations
transform their massive economic power into significant political
influence in the legislative and political arena. Large corporations spend
millions of dollars annually in lobbying efforts to impact government
policies. 174 Corporate money is used to make campaign contributions,
to lobby public officials, and to engage in issue advocacy, sometimes in
ways that seem difficult to countenance: "Coal producers, for example,
have met efforts to restrict strip mining . . . by arguing in state legis-
latures that the problem should be dealt with only at the federal level,
Speech: Why Corporate Speech Is Not Free, 83 IOWA L. REV. 995, 1007 (1998) ("The
modem publicly traded multinational corporation ... appears to be as large and well
organized, as in control of resources and potential instruments of coercion or power
over individuals as are most local governments."); Tsuk, supra note 168, at 180 n.2
("While the corporation's power to enforce its rule is different from the power of the
sovereign state to do so, the corporation's economic, social, and cultural impact has
become so pervasive in modem society so as to make corporate power, in effect,
comparable to the coercive power of the state.").
172. See Sanford A. Lakoff, Private Government in the Managed Society, in
PRIVATE GOVERNMENT 218, 225 (Sanford A. Lakoff & Daniel Rich eds., 1973) (noting
that private governments "could be even more oppressive than the state"); Samuels &
Miller, supra note 30, at 6 (arguing that "supercorporations are private bureaucracies"
and today "natural persons are overwhelmed by the power of bureaucracies, both public
and private").
173. See, e.g., Adolf A. Berle, Jr., The Developing Law of Corporate Concentration,
19 U. CHI. L. REV. 639, 643 (1952); Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Constitutional Limitations on
Corporate Activity-Protection of Personal Rights from Invasion Through Economic
Power, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 943 (1952) (introducing the theme of "consti-
tutionaliz[ing]" the corporation). One commentator argued that the enactment of a
"Corporate Bill of Rights" would destroy the myth "that our society is sufficiently
atomistic that the only concentration of political and social power against which we
must be on our guard is that which resides in the state." Russell B. Stevenson, Jr.,
Corporations and Social Responsibiliy: In Search of the Corporate Soul, 42 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 709, 733 (1974).
174. See Jill E. Fisch, The "Bad Man " Goes to Washington: The Effect of Political
Influence on Corporate Duty, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1593, 1605-07 (2006); Katie
Thoennes, Comment, Frankenstein Incorporated: The Rise of Corporate Power and
Personhood in the United States, 28 HAMLINE L. REV 203, 213-14 (2004).
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and in Congress, that the subject should be dealt with exclusively by the
states." 175  Even Justices of the United States Supreme Court have
observed that corporations give substantial sums of money to both major
national parties and to competing candidates with the expectation that, in
return, corporations will gain special access to the officials who are
ultimately elected, and with that access, "a disproportionate influence on
those in power." 176 The public is well aware that "[a]t a critical level,
[corporate] contributions that underwrite elections are leverage for enor-
mous political influence."' 177 The obvious thrust of corporate political
activity is to avoid or soften legal regulation of corporate business. 78 It
is argued that such corporate conduct threatens the integrity of
democratic politics and undermines public confidence in democratic
ideals. 179
Corporate power, seen in this light, poses obstacles to achieving
true democratic governance over the conditions of social life. The only
countervailing source of power is the state which must protect individual
rights from the potentially coercive nature of corporate economic and
political control.' 80 The state and its arm of enforcement, the law, serve
175. Stevenson, supra note 173, at 716 (citing Hearings on H.R. 60 and Related
Bills: Before the Subcomm. on Mines & Mining of the H. Comm. on Interior & Insular
Affairs, 92d Cong. 92-96 (1971)). One commentator has argued that corporations use
their powerful political influence to exercise "nondecision-making" power, i.e., the
power to bury or prevent an important potential issue from appearing on the agenda
anywhere in the political arena. Risser, supra note 101, at 25.
176. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 506 (2007) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
177. Id.
178. The effort appears to be successful, as corporations often have a role in shaping
laws that are intended to regulate their business activity. See STONE, supra note 35, at
94-95. "(Plublic policy necessarily tends to be oriented, especially over the long run, in
a direction which is fundamentally in line with the interests of the great corporate
enterprises. And this will be true even if the interests of the giants are in conflict with
other social goals." Morton S. Baratz, Corporate Giants and the Power Structure, 9 W.
POL. Q. 406, 413 (1956); see also Galanter, supra note 157, at 1399 (noting that
corporations have "a privileged position in American government, enjoying subsidies,
solicitude, and deference").
179. David D. Martin, The Corporation and Antitrust Law Policy: Double
Standards, in CORPORATIONS AND SOCIETY, supra note 30, at 193, 214; see also Gerald
Berk, Corporate Power andIts Discontents, 53 BUFF. L. REv. 1419, 1423 (2006).
180. See HENRI S. KARIEL, THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN PLURALISM 258 (1961).
"Against large-scale groups, only the state can maintain or create rights for the
protection of the individual." Id. at 259.
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to check corporate power and channel it in ways that preserve individual
well-being. A natural corollary to this position is that corporations must
not be granted the same sorts of fundamental rights that belong to indi-
viduals. "[I]f organizations are seen as potentially repressive systems of
governance, treating them as individuals and granting them the
protections, immunities, and liberties of individuals will just enhance
their repressive power."'' Therefore, this image of organizational
power seeks to impose restraints on the corporate person for the benefit
of the public interest.
There is a second view of organizations in the political pluralist
vision that defines the corporation not as a source of coercive power, but
as an essential instrument for promoting individual welfare and societal
democracy. Like the political individualist view, the state here is seen as
dangerously omnipotent with the potential to threaten individual rights.
The state is too abstract an entity to win the loyalty of individual
citizens, who are more likely to identify with the diverse groups and
associations they form naturally as social beings. 82  For example,
churches, neighborhood groups, voluntary associations, trade unions,
political parties, and corporations afford individuals a safe place to form
their identities, express their viewpoints, and establish their preferred
ways of life. 83  These intermediate groups serve as buffers between
individuals and the government, fostering individual autonomy and
shielding citizens from potentially coercive state power.184 This
181. DAN-COHEN, supra note 56, at 176. Some commentators therefore believe that
corporations should not have the same rights as individuals to engage in political
activity. See, e.g., FRENCH ET AL., supra note 16, at 87. A similar result can be reached
from a social responsibility standpoint. See Robert B. Reich, The New Meaning of
Corporate Social Responsibility, 40 CAL. MGMT. REv. 8, 16 (1998) (concluding that the
"meta-social responsibility of the corporation, then, is to respect the political process by
staying out of it").
182. See Dalia Tsuk, Corporations Without Labor: The Politics of Progressive
Corporate Law, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 1861, 1876 (2003).
183. See Tsuk, supra note 168, at 190; see also HENRY M. MAGID, ENGLISH
POLITICAL PLURALISM: THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM AND ORGANIZATION 12 (1941)
(discussing the view of pluralist John Figgis who believed groups play a vital role in the
self-development of individuals). For a discussion of the link between political
pluralism and the legal personhood of groups, see generally LEGAL PERSONALITY AND
POLITICAL PLURALISM (Leicester C. Webb ed., 1958).
184. See DAN-COHEN, supra note 56, at 177; cf Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community
and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique of Progressive Corporate Law
Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 856, 883 (1997) (observing that "religious
conservatives [also] place great importance upon local communities and other
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conception of groups draws on the image of the medieval institutions of
guilds, townships, and free cities that had powers of autonomous self-
direction and served as centers for collective and participatory self-
government.185 These groups empowered individuals to determine the
course of their own lives, rather than submitting to the direction of a
centralized state that was perceived as "anti-democratic, robbing citizens
of meaningful political participation and power."' 186  From this per-
spective, mediating groups stand between individuals and the state and
form an essential means of democratic self-rule.
The concept of mediating institutions has been explored in related
terms in the business ethics literature. In political discourse, mediating
structures are typically associated with the family, religious organi-
zations, neighborhoods, and voluntary groups. 8 7 In these groups, indi-
viduals interact closely with other members, and can see first hand the
effects of their actions. This is empowering because it gives individuals
a sense of control in knowing that they can make a difference in the
group. Business ethicists have suggested that corporations today can,
and possibly must, serve as mediating institutions in society. 188 To the
extent that so many people spend most of their day working in or
interacting with corporate organizations, "the corporation represents a
value-laden institution that outranks the local community as a focus of
loyalty and a medium for self-realization."' 8 9  In fact, it has been
mediating institutions as buffers against the encroaching powers of the central state").
For a view that the corporation can serve as a check against the power of government,
see Michael Novak, God and Man in the Corporation, 13 POL'Y REV. 9, 28 (1980).
Michael Novak believes "the publicly held business corporation is arguably the most
successful, transformative, and future-oriented institution in the modem world. It has
been far more open, more creative, and infinitely less destructive than the nation-state,
particularly the totalitarian state." MICHAEL NOVAK, ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
THE CORPORATION AS IT OUGHT To BE 3 (1997).
185. See Hager, supra note 66, at 611-15.
186. Id. at 611.
187. See PETER L. BERGER & RICHARD J. NEUHAUS, To EMPOWER PEOPLE: THE
ROLE OF MEDIATING STRUCTURES IN PUBLIC POLICY 3 (1977). But see Craig Anthony
(Tony) Arnold, The Structure of the Land Use Regulatory System in the United States,
22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 441, 461-81 (2007) (arguing that the land use regulatory
system in the United States performs primarily mediating functions between people and
places, communities and power, and freedom and boundaries).
188. See, e.g., Timothy L. Fort, Business as Mediating Institution, 6 BUS. ETHICS Q.
149, 151, 155-57 (1996).
189. Norton E. Long, The Corporations, Its Satellites, and the Local Community, in
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suggested that the traditional sources of social support such as the
family, church, and small town, have declined in our mobile and
entrepreneurial society, and corporations have taken their place.1 90 It
may be unrealistic to envision a large, multinational corporation as a
small community of shared values, but corporations may have subgroups
within them that can be so characterized. Many people today have such
a sense of camaraderie with their work colleagues that they feel closer to
their work groups than to their own immediate family members. If
corporations, or subparts of them, have become an important form of
community, they may be seen as performing an essential mediating
function for individuals in society.19' In this light, corporations should
not be regarded with suspicion, but embraced as tools for facilitating
individual and societal development.
From this point of view, democratic life depends on supporting
associational freedom and allowing individuals to pursue their own
goals through various voluntary groups like the corporation. Rather than
posing a threat to democracy, organizations such as the corporation are
constitutive elements of American society and promote its flourishing.
They provide a means for individuals to define themselves and their way
of life, rather than having these decisions made for them by an all-
powerful state. 192 This political pluralist vision regards organizations as
intrinsically beneficial and encourages their growth and autonomy, free
from state interference in their affairs.1 93 If corporations fit within this
CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY, supra note 45, at 202.
190. See DANIEL BELL, THE COMING OF POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY: A VENTURE IN
SOCIAL FORECASTING 289 (1973); SOLOMON, supra note 137, at 146-47; Long, supra
note 189, at 202 ("[P]eople may be more citizens of the corporations for whom they
work than of the local communities in which they reside.").
191. See Fort, supra note 188, at 153-55 (discussing mediating institutions' societal
importance). But cf Hager, supra note 66, at 650 (arguing that, for purposes of group
free expression rights, corporations are collections of capital, not collections of people,
and therefore corporations are very different from trade unions, churches, benevolent
societies, and other traditional associational groups that deserve associational freedom
rights).
192. See Bainbridge, supra note 184, at 897 (concluding that "it is perfectly
plausible to think of the corporation as an intermediary institution standing between the
individual and Leviathan" and noting that the corporation can "act as a vital
countervailing force against the state").
193. See David Schneiderman, Harold Laski, Viscount Haldane, and the Law of the
Canadian Constitution in the Early Twentieth Century, 48 U. TORONTO L.J. 521, 529
(1998) (describing the views of pluralist Harold Laski, who "attack[ed] the all-
absorptive state and promot[ed] the inherent worthiness of group associations"); Tsuk,
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framework, they play an important political role in fostering individual
development and restraining the power of government.
B. Comments
The role of the corporate person in our political system is open to
different interpretations depending on one's normative vision of the
ideal political state. One strand of political pluralism views corporations
as sources of oppressive power that must be curbed by the state.
Another strand reverses these positions and seeks to protect corporations
from coercive state interference in order to preserve individual auton-
omy. The common thread is a recognition that corporations are socially
and politically significant, and have the power to affect society in
dramatic ways. 194
To acknowledge that corporations are social and political
institutions naturally complicates our understanding of the role of the
corporate person vis-d-vis the state and individuals in society. The
stakes become much higher. Some have maintained that the struggle
over corporate personhood is no less than a part of the larger struggle
over the future of American democracy.1 95 Because we can so vigor-
ously disagree on our prescriptions for achieving the ideal democratic
society, our views of the corporation's role in that endeavor will always
be contentious and controversial.
Each of the various theories of the corporation's social and political
role reflects a different dimension of the corporate person when viewed
through that particular prism. Each viewpoint is informative because
each carries an element of truth in its observation. The large corporation
supra note 168, at 192 (noting that pluralists Berle and Means "feared that an overuse
of government regulation could eliminate potential benefits of corporate power" and
instead wanted to "encourage the development of diverse collective institutions to
promote various experiences and actions"); see also DAN-COHEN, supra note 56, at 177
(noting that the pluralist's concern is for "the autonomy of voluntary associations and
their relative immunity from state interference in their internal affairs").
194. As Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means observed: "[A] giant corporation is a
tremendous force which can harm or benefit a multitude of individuals, affect whole
districts, shift the currents of trade, bring ruin to one community and prosperity to
another. The[se] organizations ... have passed far beyond the realm of private enter-
prise-they have become more nearly social institutions." BERLE & MEANS, supra note
46, at 46.
195. See Hager, supra note 66, at 639.
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indisputably is a source of tremendous political and social power. But
so is the government. Both can wield that power coercively. Our task
then is to balance these collective centers of power in ways that do not
inhibit the productive activities of both. The law can be used as a
mediating force to direct and articulate that balancing process. 196 How-
ever, that balance must constantly be readjusted as our society and our
corporations evolve and grow. The role of corporations is not static, but
may change as we play out our ongoing experiment in democracy and
work out our societal vision for the good and prosperous life.
The desire to reach that good and prosperous life ties into one
dimension of the corporate person that is not often discussed in main-
stream academia: the spiritual aspect of corporations. This element can
seem trivial and almost nonsensical to many who would prefer to focus
on the more traditional disciplines of economics or politics when ana-
lyzing corporate activity. 197 However, this Article attempts to present a
broader array of disciplinary perspectives on the corporate person. The
following section discusses the proposition that certain spiritual
elements are part of the corporate person too.
196. See William W. Bratton, The Economic Structure of the Post-Contractual
Corporation, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 180, 212-15 (1992).
197. See Michael Naughton, The Corporation as a Community of Work:
Understanding the Firm Within the Catholic Social Tradition, 4 AVE MARIA L. REV. 33,
39 (2006) (describing but disagreeing with "[t]he general impression within the West..
. that religion and theology at best have no relevance for corporate life, and at worst
tend to foster incompetence and inefficiency"). Those who do discuss corporations in
spiritual terms often appear to feel the need to defend their subject matter. They argue
that we should consider all relevant voices in a discussion over the purpose of corpo-
rations, whether they are religious or secular. See Helen Alford & Michael J.
Naughton, Beyond the Shareholder Model of the Firm: Working Toward the Common
Good of a Business, in RETHINKING THE PURPOSE OF BUSINESS: INTERDISCIPLINARY
ESSAYS FROM THE CATHOLIC SOCIAL TRADITION 27, 44 n.4 (S.A. Cortright & Michael J.
Naughton eds., 2002) [hereinafter RETHINKING THE PURPOSE OF BUSINESS]. They
believe that intellectual positions based on religious sources can stand or fall on their
own merits and should not be rejected on the basis of whether one accepts or rejects the
particular religious tradition: "[Olne would not avoid reading Karl Marx or Frederick
Taylor simply because one is not a Marxist or a Taylorist. The Catholic social tradition,
with its communal orientation, provides an understanding of organizational purpose that
is a serious alternative to that of classical or reVised liberalism, and on that basis alone
deserves consideration." Id.
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VI. SPIRITUAL DIMENSION OF THE CORPORATE PERSON
In addition to the legal, economic, social, and political roles that
corporations play in society, some scholars argue that the corporate
person also has theological significance.' 98 Corporations are means to
pursue the worthiest of ends, ends that are higher than themselves and
the pursuit of profit. At their best, corporations can become the locus of
activities that ultimately serve the ends of justice, liberality, and charity.
A. The Spiritual Identity and Purpose of the Corporation
Modem American theologian, Michael Novak, assigns a full
spiritual identity to the corporation, describing it as an "incarnation of
God's presence in this world."' 199 According to his philosophy, the
creative and innovative aspects of corporations, the ability of
corporations to increase human wealth and thereby combat poverty, the
communal environment the corporate workplace provides for people to
work out their identities and salvation-all testify to the good and
beneficial nature of corporations, and together they offer a type of
"metaphor[] for grace, a kind of insight into God's ways in history. ' 20 0
The corporation is seen as a moral institution with the capacity to be a
channel of grace for the world if given the freedom to thrive and
maximize profits. In contrast, the state is a source of coercive power
198. While there may be other religious traditions that have strong views of the
nature and role of corporations in American society, Catholic Social Thought (CST)
appears to have played a dominant role in the legal academic writing on the subject in
the United States. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Catholic Social Thought and the
Corporation, 1 J. CATH. Soc. THOUGHT 595 (2004); Jean-Yves Calvez & Michael J.
Naughton, Catholic Social Teaching and the Purpose of the Business Organization: A
Developing Tradition, in RETHINKING THE PURPOSE OF BUSINESS, supra note 197, at 3;
Scott Fitzgibbon, "True Human Community": Catholic Social Thought, Aristotelian
Ethics, and the Moral Order of the Business Community, 45 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1243
(2001); Mark A. Sargent, Competing Visions of the Corporation in Catholic Social
Thought, 1 J. CATH. Soc. THOUGHT 561 (2004). Therefore, this Article will focus pri-
marily on the views of CST subscribers.
199. MICHAEL NOVAK, TOWARD A THEOLOGY OF THE CORPORATION 39 (rev. ed.
1990).
200. Id. at 49. Michael Novak argues that "[bjusiness is a noble Christian vocation,
a work of social justice, and the single greatest institutional hope of the poor of the
world." Michael Novak, A Philosophy of Economics, 1 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 791, 791
(2004).
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that must be curbed to preserve a free and virtuous society. 20' It follows
that corporations should be allowed to operate without state interference
or the burdens of complying with communitarian notions of corporate
social responsibility. While this view of corporations has been widely
criticized, even by those within the same religious tradition,20 2 many
commentators agree that the corporation has a role in helping human
beings achieve the good and virtuous life.
In particular, corporations are regarded as instruments serving
natural, human ends, as well as supernatural, spiritual ends. From an
Aristotelian perspective, human beings are not intended merely to live,
to stay alive, or to survive, but they are intended to "live well," to
flourish, and to live for the highest and noblest things. 203 Corporations
provide human beings with the means to flourish by giving them the
time and resources to focus on endeavors beyond merely surviving.
"[I]f everyone were required to feed, clothe, and otherwise provide for
himself and his family.., with the sole use of his own means and enter-
prise, . . . [e]ach person would spend all of his time merely surviving,"
rather than having the freedom to seek a more enriching existence.20 4
Corporations serve society by providing essential goods and services
that meet the real material needs of consumers. By doing so, they free
human beings to engage themselves in the process of achieving the good
life. 205 Individuals can focus on developing virtues within themselves
201. See NOVAK, supra note 199, at 31-34. "[T]he prevailing moral threat in our era
may not be the power of the corporations but the growing power and irresponsibility of
the state." Id. at 34. In contrast, the corporation is "a useful instrument of social
justice, a mediating institution between isolated individuals and the omnipotent state."
Id. at3.
202. See, e.g., Sargent, supra note 198, at 577-81, 588-92. Mark Sargent believes
"Novak's theology is more than a little wobbly," id. at 577, and that his anti-
communitarian and pro-capitalist arguments are "exactly backwards." Id. at 581.
203. See Schall, supra note 23, at 112. "Aristotle's central ethical concept is a
unified, all-embracing notion of 'happiness' (or, more accurately, eudaimonia, perhaps
better translated as 'flourishing' or 'doing well')." SOLOMON, supra note 137, at 105.
See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, reprinted in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1127, 1139-40
(Richard McKeon ed., Benjamin Jowett trans., Random House 1941) (distinguishing
between the base pursuit of wealth for its own sake and the more noble pursuit of
wealth for the higher purpose of "living well").
204. Schall, supra note 23, at 110.
205. Cf Naughton, supra note 197, at 40 (proposing a "'theology of institutions'
model of the corporation in which the corporation acts "as a servant to the larger society
in such a way that people grow and develop) (citing Robert K. Greenleaf, The Need for
a Theology of Institutions, in SEEKER AND SERVANT: REFLECTIONS ON RELIGIOUS
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and molding a more virtuous society. Corporations that function prop-
erly can help make society more just and thus contribute to the common
good .206 The common good of the community is the sum of all those
social conditions that support the full development of human personality
and facilitate the fulfillment of each person's life.20 7
The corporate person also contributes to the common good of its
members. The organizational common good is "the promotion of all the
goods necessary for integral human development in the organization...
,208 It "encompasses everything that is conducive to the human flour-
ishing of each person" in the group. 209 Business is considered a com-
munity of persons who are forged together by their work and who relate
to one another in interdependent ways. Under this view, human beings
are inherently social, and their social environment helps shape their
moral personality.210 One's personal identity and meaning is created
and defined by one's interaction with others.211 For example, a man's
identity as a father, son, manager, mentor, and company softball team
player is inextricably linked to his relationships with others. The com-
munity in which he is embedded plays an essential role in defining who
he is. As a community of individuals, the corporation at its best
provides a moral environment where individuals can interact and
LEADERSHIP 191 (Anne T. Fraker & Larry C. Spears eds., 1996)).
206. See Domenec Mele, Not Only Stakeholder Interests: The Firm Oriented
Toward the Common Good, in RETHINKING THE PURPOSE OF BUSINESS, supra note 197,
at 190, 198.
207. Robert G. Kennedy, Corporations, Common Goods, and Human Persons, 4
AVE MARIA L. REV. 1, 18 n.58 (2006).
208. Alford & Naughton, supra note 197, at 38.
209. Mele, supra note 206, at 194.
210. See Gerald J. Russello, Catholic Social Thought and the Large Multinational
Corporation, 46 J. CATH. LEG. STUD. 107, 124 (2007); Sargent, supra note 198, at 565;
see also Scruton, supra note 56, at 257 (arguing that "something vital is missing from
the natural person who is without the experience of membership--something necessary
to his perfection. Lacking it, your attitude to the world and to others is one of
'diminished responsibility,' while your personal relations become defeasible,
rescindable, and renegotiable in the interests of gain.").
211. See SOLOMON, supra note 137, at 146-48 (discussing the Aristotelian view of
man's social nature and asserting that "we find our identities and our meanings only
wfthin communities, and for most of us that means at work in a company or an
institution"); see also Fort, supra note 188, at 152 (discussing sociologist Robert
Nisbet's views of human social needs and suggesting that social interaction is required
"to create a person's very identity").
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develop their identities. If the corporation shows concern for its em-
ployees by giving them satisfying work, a voice in the manner of doing
their work, the opportunity to fellowship and form friendships, and a fair
share of the rewards of the organization's successes, then it supports the
dignity and fulfillment of its members as human beings.21 2
Such a corporate community is where individual members can learn
and exercise spiritual virtues. The concept of corporations as mediating
institutions reappears in this context. The classic mediating institutions
213
are associated with the family, church, and voluntary associations.
These are the centers where people learn certain virtues, such as love,
patience, respect, kindness, justice, courage, and loyalty. In our modem
world, however, the traditional mediating institutions may be giving way
to the work environment as the place where virtues will have to be
developed. "Work consumes too much time for one to think that
virtuous habits are only cultivated in some separate cultural sphere and
then brought to the corporation. If the corporation is rightly ordered, it
will be a place where the habit of justice [among others] is
developed., 214 Subscribers of this view believe the work environment
carries extremely important spiritual significance for individuals: "For
many of us, the two most important institutions in our lives are our
families and the organizations for which we work .... [T]hey are often
the two places where we will save or lose our souls. ' 2 15 The corporation
thus holds a valuable function as a modem day mediating institution
where spiritual and ethical virtues can be fostered.
212. See Kennedy, supra note 207, at 29-3 1. This viewpoint places a special value
on human labor. The "best work is not necessarily the work with the best pay. It is the
work that most completely draws out the potential of the worker and develops him as a
human person .... " Robert G. Kennedy, The Virtue of Solidarity and the Purpose of
the Firm, in RETHINKING THE PURPOSE OF BUSINESS, supra note 197, at 48, 55.
213. See Fort, supra note 188, at 150; see also supra notes 187-91 and
accompanying text (discussing mediating institutions in the political pluralist context).
214. D. Stephen Long, Corporations and the Common Good, 4 AVE MARIA L. REV.
77, 98 (2006); see also Fort, supra note 34, at 264 ("Given that we spend a large
percentage of our waking hours working, it is only logical that our moral identities are
formed not only in families and churches, but at work as well."). Timothy Fort argues
that because "much of a person's conscious life will be involved with work, . . . there is
a need to remake corporations into mediating structures themselves." Fort, supra note
188, at 150-51. He describes Harvard economist Juliet Schor's work which shows that
prior to capitalism, people worked far fewer hours and had much more leisure time than
they do today. See id. at 151 (citing JULIET B. SCHOR, THE OVERWORKED AMERICAN:
THE UNEXPECTED DECLINE OF LEISURE (1991)).
215. Naughton, supra note 197, at 40-41.
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The normative goal of this spiritual approach to corporations is not
the maximization of profits, but the flourishing of all members of the
organization and the common good of the community. Profit-making is
considered only a "foundational" or "instrumental" good, which is
subordinate to "excellent" or "inherent" goods like human development,
moral self-possession, and community.1 6  Instrumental goods are
important, and in fact, necessary for achieving excellent goods.
However, instrumental goods should not be pursued for their own sake
because to do so improperly makes an end out of a means.217 Profit-
making as an instrumental good is essential because if the corporation
does not create sufficient profits, it has no hope of survival and no
possibility of contributing to the common good of its members or
society. 2  Even so, profits should be viewed only as an indication, or a
byproduct, of a well functioning firm.219  They are a measure of its
success in operating its business in the appropriate manner. To the
extent a corporation is concerned solely with profits as the exclusive
objective of its business, it operates out of a truncated view of the
purpose of the organization and fails to fulfill its role as a site where
excellent goods can be pursued. 2 0 Treating the acquisition of wealth as
an end in itself is considered a vice that "contributes to the spiritual
emptiness of a materialistic culture and undermines the common
good., 221 The corporation must strive to maintain the proper ordering of
216. See Alford & Naughton, supra note 197, at 35-36.
217. See Charles Handy, What's a Business For?, HARV. Bus. REv., Dec. 2002, at
49, 51. Charles Handy views this as a moral issue: "To mistake the means for the end
is to be turned in on oneself, which Saint Augustine called one of the greatest sins."
Handy does not speak explicitly in terms of "instrumental" or "excellent" goods, but
effectively makes the same point: "We need to eat to live; food is a necessary condition
of life. But if we lived mainly to eat, making food a sufficient or sole purpose of life,
we would become gross." Id. In relating this to the profit motive, he argues that "[t]he
purpose of a business ... is not to make a profit, full stop. It is to make a profit so that
the business can do something more or better. That 'something' becomes the real
justification for the business." Id.
218. See Alford & Naughton, supra note 197, at 37.
219. See Kennedy, supra note 207, at 25.
220. See Alford & Naughton, supra note 197, at 38; see also Kennedy, supra note
212, at 59 (arguing that a good corporation "is not one that rejects the criteria of the
economic paradigm; it is rather one that meets these criteria and more"). Robert
Kennedy believes the "problem is not that we expect too much offirms, but rather that
we are prepared to settle for too little." Kennedy, supra note 212, at 59.
221. Sargent, supra note 198, at 566. Mark Sargent acknowledges that the
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instrumental and excellent goods in order for the corporation to serve its
spiritually meaningful purpose.
Therefore, according to this view, corporations must be dedicated to
supporting the values that bring about the development of all persons
and society. As a matter of corporate social responsibility, this means,
among other things, corporations should be concerned with protecting
the environment, producing quality products that are safe, treating their
employees well, preventing global labor abuses, and avoiding
cooperation with oppressive government regimes. 222  Corporations
should take into account the impact of their decisions on others and try
to act in ways that benefit, rather than harm, the community. Some
commentators believe the law should be designed to ensure corporate
social responsibility and impose on the corporate person "a legally-
constituted social conscience," even if it means shareholder profits may
not always be maximized.223 Others disagree, arguing that the state
should have no role in enforcing mandatory codes of honorable or
trustworthy corporate behavior.224 Ultimately, most agree that when it
comes to the spiritual elements of the corporate person, the ideal vision
of the corporation is one that fosters human flourishing, protects rather
than undermines human dignity, and "brings us closer to God's
kingdom., 225 It is the means and method by which this ideal can be
reached that is the subject of debate.
In contrast, some scholars who hold the same religious views
believe corporations have grown so powerful and immoral that they
cannot be redeemed, and no amount of idealizing will change this fact:
"Though there has been much discussion about making corporations
communitarian vision of the corporation breaks sharply with the shareholder wealth
maximization norm that prevails in current economic theory and legal doctrine. Id. at
570. Under the communitarian model, the profit maximization norm is thought to blind
corporate managers from pursuing more excellent goods. See HELEN J. ALFORD &
MICHAEL J. NAUGHTON, MANAGING AS IF FAITH MATTERED: CHRISTIAN SOCIAL
PRINCIPLES IN THE MODERN ORGANIZATION 47 (2001) ("By elevating shareholder
wealth to the status of the ultimate good, the shareholder model in effect erects a
'tyranny of foundational goods,' inhibiting managers from considering more excellent
goods except as instruments to increase profits.").
222. See Sargent, supra note 198, at 567.
223. Id. at 568.
224. See Bainbridge, supra note 184, at 893; see also id. at 897 (relying in part on
some of Michael Novak's statements to argue that "minimizing state regulation of
corporate governance is essential to the preservation of a free, yet virtuous society").
225. Naughton, supra note 197, at 72.
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moral or socially responsible, their legal DNA prevents them from
acting like humans and having the chance to act in moral ways.
226
Therefore, the argument goes, the legal personhood of corporations
should be abolished so that business people will be obliged to assume
personal and social responsibility for their own business actions. 227 The
hope is that the abolition of corporations will allow businesses to evolve
in ways that will be more accountable to the common good.228 While
this view may seem drastic, it has gained increasing support outside of
religious circles in the wake of the corporate frauds and scandals that
have occurred in the last decade.229
B. Comments
Attributing spiritual significance to the corporation creates an ideal
vision of what the corporation is and how it should function. The lan-
guage that is used to speak of corporations in this context is moralistic
and philosophical. It seeks to criticize but also to inspire. It shares
226. William Quigley, Catholic Social Thought and the Amorality of Large
Corporations: Time to Abolish Corporate Personhood, 5 LoY. J. PUB. INT. L. 109, 109
(2004).
227. See id.
228. See id. at 129.
229. Galvanized by the corporate misconduct underlying the collapse of so many
large companies, a growing movement of organized activist groups, not associated with
any particular religion, seeks passionately to eliminate the personhood of corporations
in our legal system. They see their cause as similar to that of the abolitionists who
worked to end the institution of slavery: "Slavery is the legal fiction that a person is
property. Corporate personhood is the legal fiction that property is a person." Molly
Morgan & Jan Edwards, Abolish Corporate Personhood, 59 GUILD PRAc. 209, 214
(2002). Many of these activist groups effectively use the Internet to communicate their
message to a worldwide audience. Their Web sites are often quite comprehensive,
linking the reader to numerous books, articles, and sources relating to corporate
personhood and its effects on society and the law. See, e.g., Reclaim Democracy,
http://www.reclaimdemocracy.org; Program on Corporations, Law & Democracy,
http://www.poclad.org; Citizens Intent on Reforming Corporate Accountability,
http://www.firstuucolumbus.org; Women's International League for Peace and
Freedom, http://www.wilpf.org; Community Environmental Legal Defense Fund,
http://www.celdf.org; Redwood Coast Alliance for Democracy,
http://www.iiipublishing.com; California Center for Community Democracy,
http://www.californiademocracy.org; Big Medicine Central, http://www.nancho.net;
Democracy Unlimited of Humboldt County, http://www.duhc.org (Web sites last
visited Oct. 2, 2009).
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much in common with the stakeholder model of the corporation which
views all corporate constituents as having a stake in or a claim on the
corporation.20 Each group has a right not to be treated as a means to an
end, but as an integral part of the corporation in which all have an
interest.2 1 The stakeholder model requires that all stakeholders' inter-
ests must be considered, balanced, and preserved to the greatest extent
possible in every action that the corporation takes.
Although the spiritual view of corporations possesses similarities
with the stakeholder model, the spiritual approach adds a different
element to the analysis. Rather than viewing the corporation as a
collection of various group interests, each of which has a right to be
protected, the spiritual approach hesitates to use the terminology of
"interests" at all because it reflects a self-centered orientation toward
life. Instead, the spiritual model values the common good of all. "It has
an ethical foundation that both the shareholder and the stakeholder
models lack: it is founded not on what each group wants for itself, but
on what is normatively good for that group and for others. 232 There is a
deeper sense that corporations can and should be "just" and "virtuous"
entities.233
As much as advocates of the spiritual model may wish that their
views be judged on their intellectual merits regardless of one's religious
beliefs, it may be difficult for those who do not share the same faith to
accept their vision. Critics may feel that discussions of the spiritual ele-
ment of corporations amount to sermonizing and moral exhortation
without a close connection to the real world of business. Proponents of
the spiritual model recognize this as an issue and seek to transform their
vision into more concrete and practical terms.234
230. See Timothy L. Fort, The Corporation as Mediating Institution: An Efficacious
Synthesis of Stakeholder Theory and Corporate Constituency Statutes, 73 NOTRE DAME
L. REv. 173, 184-96 (1997) (discussing the stakeholder theory, its development, and
some criticisms). Stakeholders include not only shareholders, but also employees,
creditors, customers, suppliers, and the larger community. See Lisa M. Fairfax, The
Rhetoric of Corporate Law: The Impact of Stakeholder Rhetoric on Corporate Norms,
31 J. CORP. L. 675, 680 (2006) (describing the conception of the "stakeholder").
231. See Freeman, supra note 19, at 56.
232. James Gordley, Virtue and the Ethics of Profit Seeking, in RETHINKING THE
PURPOSE OF BUSINESS, supra note 197, at 65, 78.
233. See Sargent, supra note 198, at 571 n.21 (describing the views of Monsignor
John A. Ryan).
234. See id. at 592. Mark Sargent suggests that "[t]here is a great need for
theoretical imagination and practical ingenuity" to overcome the difficulties of
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For my purposes, the fact that corporations can be viewed from a
spiritual perspective attests to the complexity of the corporate person.
The spiritual approach reveals yet another dimension of the corporation,
opening up another lens through which it can be analyzed and ultimately
judged or praised. Whether or not one agrees with the teachings of the
spiritual view, one can acknowledge that it reflects how pervasively the
corporation has captured the minds of not only legal scholars, historians,
philosophers, political theorists, sociologists, and psychologists, but also
religious thinkers. The corporate person is too important a subject to
elude the critical examination of even its possible spiritual dimension
and purpose.
In stark contrast to the ideas associated with the spiritual model of
corporations, the economic theory of corporations repudiates the belief
that corporations can or should have any purpose beyond acting as a
contractual center for economic exchanges. The following section de-
scribes the neoclassical economic approach to the firm. It draws upon a
methodological individualist conception of human beings that is
radically different from the social conception of human beings so central
to the spiritual approach.
VII. ECONOMIC THEORY OF THE CORPORATION
A. Nexus of Contracts Model
The economic paradigm of the corporation relies on a contract
metaphor rooted in neoclassical economic theory. Under this paradigm,
the corporation is merely a fiction that serves as a nexus of contracts
among the firm's various individual participants. 235 These "contracts"
are not true contracts as defined by law, but the economist's notion of
contracts as reciprocal arrangements involving mutual expectations
between parties.236 The human parties are defined according to the
economist's notion of rational self-interested actors who freely contract
implementing the goals of the spiritual model in corporate law. Id. Otherwise, the
spiritual approach will be nothing other than "a challenging, but ultimately irrelevant set
of religious reflections on business organization and behavior." Id.
235. The nexus of contracts terminology first appeared in 1976. See Jensen &
Meckling, supra note 20, at 311.
236. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89
COLUM. L. REv. 1549, 1549 (1989).
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according to their own utility calculations.237 The corporation is the
center of a mass of contracts between shareholders, managers,
employees, creditors, suppliers, and others who come together, as the
result of market forces, to gain the benefit of their bargains with each
other.
From this perspective, no independent, real corporate entity exists.
The idea of a separate corporate person is only a convenient fiction. The
corporate entity itself has no precise boundaries, and "it makes little or
no sense to try to distinguish between those things which are 'inside' the
firm ... from those things that are 'outside' of it."' 238 As a result, the
concept of the distinct corporate person tends to disappear.239
Ownership of the firm also disappears as a meaningful concept.24°
Since the organization decomposes into a group of identifiable partici-
pants who negotiate an equilibrium position among themselves, no one
class of participants, not even the shareholder class, has a right to regard
itself as the owner of the corporation. 24' The shareholders are just one
237. See Phillips, supra note 77, at 439 (observing that under the nexus of contracts
theory, the component human beings "are not flesh-and-blood people, but the utility-
maximizing rational actors of economic theory"); see also Bratton, supra note 28, at
462 (arguing that the economic theory "depends on rational economic actors denuded of
significant human characteristics"). This has been the source of some criticism of the
theory because it arguably fails to accommodate human beings in their full variety and
complexity. See Phillips, supra note 28, at 1111.
238. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 20, at 311; see also Oliver Hart, An
Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1757, 1764
(1989). Some scholars believe it is better to use the term "contractual theory" than
"nexus of contracts" because the latter might imply "the corporation exists as an entity
apart from the contracts among its participants." Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein,
Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L.
REv. 1, 3 n.1 (1990). They argue there is no conceptual justification for reifying the
mass of interrelated contractual relationships that compose the corporation. Id.
239. William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation,
14 CARDozo L. REv. 261, 265 (1992); see also Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout,
Specific Investment: Explaining Anomalies in Corporate Law, 31 J. CORP. L. 719, 739
(2006) (criticizing the nexus of contracts model because it fails to tell us exactly where
the corporation ends and the rest of the world begins).
240. Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL.
EcoN. 288, 289-90 (1980); see also Lynne L. Dallas, Two Models of Corporate
Governance: Beyond Berle & Means, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 19, 23 (1988) (noting that
ownership of the firm does not exist under this model "because no one can own a
'nexus"').
241. See Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for
Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21
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of the various suppliers of inputs whose rights are determined by the
many interrelated contracts making up the corporation. That said, the
managers are considered the agents of the shareholder principals who
agree to bear the residual risk if the firm is not successful.24 2 In return,
the managers' role is to act in ways that maximize shareholder interests.
The risk that managers will fail to do so generates agency costs that
must be constrained by internal and external market forces if the
corporation is to produce gains for all of its constituent parties and ul-
timately for the shareholders as residual claimants.243
According to the nexus of contracts model, the corporation springs
up naturally as a product of private, voluntary actions by people who are
free to contract in their own self-interest. 244 The corporation is not a
metaphysical entity with its own ontological standing, nor is its exist-
ence a privilege bestowed by the state. It is a private undertaking by
individual citizens. The nexus of contracts model constitutes a modern
variant of the aggregate theory of corporate personhood which says the
corporation is nothing more than the collection of individuals who
choose to group together to conduct their business in corporate form. 245
STETSON L. REv. 23, 27 (1991) (citing J. CHOPER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPORATIONS 28-29 (3d ed. 1989)).
242. See Blair & Stout, supra note 239, at 725 (describing the views of Frank
Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, who argue that even though the "nexus" may not have
an owner, it is still conceptually useful to treat the managers as agents of the
shareholders who contract to be the firm's residual claimants); see generally FRANK H.
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW
(1991).
243. See William T. Allen, Contracts and Communities in Corporation Law, 50
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1395, 1400 (1993).
244. See Bratton, supra note 28, at 451.
245. See discussion of aggregate theory supra Part II.B. In this sense, the
foundational concepts of the nexus of contracts model are not necessarily novel.
Although the nexus of contracts theory is regarded as a modem-day economics-based
theory, early 20th Century thinkers about the corporate form also made use of
contractual concepts when discussing corporate personhood. For example, in 1911,
W.M. Geldart's discussion of the legal personality of corporations utilized language
that, in hindsight, resonates with the nexus of contracts model:
If we are going to get nearer to the facts, we must at least add the notion of contract to
that of co-ownership, a contract made by every shareholder with every other, limiting
his right of ownership to a right to share in profits and to vote at shareholders'
meetings, contracts between each shareholder and the directors, between each
shareholder and every person who supplies a ton of coals or steel rails; innumerable
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This model of the corporation is based on a methodological
individualist conception of human beings and their behavior. Under this
view, the basic unit of analysis for any economic, political, or legal
theory is always the atomistic individual, never the group.246 The
premise is that "society is constituted of autonomous, equal, units,
namely separate individuals, and that such individuals are more impor-
tant, ultimately, than any larger constituent group. 2 47 We are each first
of all individuals who then enter into various agreements with each other
in society.248 Individuals are ontologically prior to corporations, which,
as fictions, have significance only because of the freely contracted
arrangements of their human constituents. 249 This individualist view is
linked to classical liberalism, focusing on individual freedom, rather
than utilitarian social maximization. 250  The individualist conception is
contracts to the making of which he has not given a moment's thought. To escape
from the fictitious person we have fallen into the arms of the fictitious contract.
Geldart, supra note 54, at 97-98.
246. See Horwitz, supra note 35, at 181; Thomas A. Smith, The Use and Abuse of
Corporate Personality, 2 STAN. AGORA 69, 71 (2001). Some observers believe the
emphasis on the individual is found in political philosophies based in natural law.
Scruton, supra note 56, at 260-61.
247. ALAN MACFARLANE, THE ORIGINS OF ENGLISH INDIVIDUALISM 5 (1978); see
also May Brodbeck, Methodological Individualisms: Definition and Reduction, in
READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 280 (May Brodbeck ed., 1968)
(discussing methodological individualism); J.W.N. Watkins, Methodological
Individualism and Social Tendencies, in READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES, supra, at 270-71 ("Every complex social situation, institution, or event is the
result of a particular configuration of individuals .... [W]e shall not have arrived at rock-
bottom explanations of such large-scale phenomena until we have deduced an account
of them from statements about the dispositions, beliefs, resources, and inter-relations of
individuals.").
248. See SOLOMON, supra note 137, at 77. The formation of society itself can be
seen as the product of voluntary arrangements, as described by social contract theory.
See id.; Ruskola, supra note 164, at 1622 ("In our legal culture, contract constitutes the
dominant paradigm of private ordering which is then projected onto the public sphere as
a hypothetical 'social contract."'); see also DONALDSON, supra note 78, at 39-41
(discussing social contract theory as contemplated by Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau).
249. See Scruton, supra note 56, at 254 (describing the "ontological priority" thesis
that we can have human beings without corporations, but no corporations without
human beings); see also McMahon, supra note 86, at 541 (discussing the ontological
status of organizations and describing "ontological individualism" which denies the
existence of social objects distinct from the individuals who comprise them).
250. See J. William Callison, Federalism, Regulatory Competition, and the Limited
Liability Movement: The Coyote Howled and the Herd Stampeded, 26 J. CORP. L. 951,
975 (2001). The liberal individualism that underlies the nexus of contracts model has
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appealing because of its emphasis on autonomy, self-realization, and
responsibility, as well as its deep commitment to humanism.2 5  It
presumes that people are and should be free to make their own choices
about how to live their lives and achieve their goals.
Normatively speaking, the nexus of contracts theory not only
describes corporations as the center of interrelated contracts between
freely contracting individuals, but also asserts that corporations should
be permitted to function freely in that way. 52 The private individuals
who voluntarily enter into these contracts should be given wide
discretion to order their affairs in whatever manner they choose.2 53 The
law should provide only a set of non-mandatory default rules that the
parties can change by voluntary agreement if they desire. 54  These
default rules should be enabling rules that reflect the terms the parties, as
rational, informed actors, would have bargained for hypothetically if
links to F.A. Hayek's political theory which envisions the creation of spontaneous
social orders when individuals are free to make their own market choices and contracts.
All of society benefits when individuals are afforded such autonomy without state inter-
ference. See DONALDSON, supra note 78, at 70 (discussing Hayek's philosophy).
Hayek and Sir Karl Popper are considered the founding fathers of methodological indi-
vidualism. See Gunther Teubner, How the Law Thinks: Toward a Constructivist
Epistemology of Law, 23 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 727, 731 (1989).
251. It has been suggested that many in the contemporary legal academy are drawn
to liberal individualism, and therefore drawn to the nexus of contracts model because of
its intrinsic liberal underpinnings. See Bratton, supra note 28, at 457-58; see also David
Millon, Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in Corporate Law, 50 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 1373, 1388 n.43 (1993) (expressing concern that most elite law school
professors "appear to be more or less wedded to the political value judgments that
underlie the neoclassical economic approach (i.e. contractarian) to corporate law").
252. See Gordon, supra note 236, at 1550.
253. See Butler & Ribstein, supra note 238, at 7-8. In this liberal model, the most
important laws are those that protect private property rights and enforce contracts. See
Allen, supra note 243, at 1396; see also Callison, supra note 250, at 977 ("[L]iberalism
values rules which permit people to live their own lives based on their own preferences,
structure their relationships with others, and define their duties to them by means of
consent. Contract is a critical focus [because].. . it is through contract that autonomous
individuals define their relationships with others.").
254. See Lucian A. Bebchuck, Foreword: The Debate on Contractual Freedom in
Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395, 1396-97 (1989); Fred S. McChesney,
Economics, Law, and Science in the Corporate Field: A Critique of Eisenberg, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1530, 1537-38 (1989); see also EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note
242, at 15; Larry E. Ribstein, The Mandatory Nature of the ALl Code, 61 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 984, 989-91 (1993).
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they could have done so in a costless setting.25 5 Individuals can freely
contract around these rules and set the terms of their own interactions as
they see fit. There should be no government policing of their relation-
ships and contracts; rather, the state should yield to freedom of contract
principles.
From this standpoint, corporations should be free to do what they
do best, generate profits for shareholders. Under the "shareholder pri-
macy" or "profit maximization" principle, 56 the interests of other con-
stituencies must be incidental or subordinate to the corporation's
primary concern for maximizing shareholder wealth. Non-shareholder
constituents can all contract for their own protections.257 It follows then
that corporations should not be saddled with social or moral respon-
sibilities to non-shareholder constituents. Because the corporation is
only "a legal fiction that serves as a nexus for a mass of contracts which
various individuals have voluntarily entered into for their mutual benefit,
... [it] is incapable of having social or moral obligations much in the
same way that inanimate objects are incapable of having these
obligations., 258 When the corporation maximizes profits, it fulfills all of
255. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 242, at 15; Gordon, supra note 236,
at 1550-51; see also Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:
An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 89-91 (1989).
256. The shareholder primacy principle is widely accepted as a dominant theme of
corporate law. See Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of
Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 646-47 (2006). A famous judicial
articulation of the shareholder primacy principle is found in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,
170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). "A business corporation is organized and carried on pri-
marily for the profit of the stockholders." Id. at 684. Some have argued that market
jurisdictions worldwide have all arrived at, or are in the process of converging toward,
the same standard model of shareholder primacy. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier
Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439 (2001). But
see Adam Winkler, Corporate Law or the Law of Business?: Stakeholders and
Corporate Governance at the End of History, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 112
(2004) (arguing that "[f]ree market principles and shareholder primacy have not won
the day; they exist in corporate law alongside the many other areas of the law of
business that do interfere with the free market ... in the interests of corporate stake-
holders").
257. See John R. Boatright, Fiduciary Duties and the Shareholder-Management
Relation: Or, What's So Special About Shareholders?, 4 Bus. ETHIcs Q. 393, 395
(1994) (explaining the argument that shareholders are different from bondholders,
suppliers, employees, customers and others because non-shareholders are protected by
contracts and other safeguards, while the shareholders are left to bear the preponderance
of risk).
258. Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REv.
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its so-called social and moral obligations.25 9 By maximizing profits,
which creates wealth for the entire economy and promotes efficient
resource allocation, the corporation ultimately benefits all of its
constituencies and society as a whole.260  The more profits a company
makes, the more those profits feed back into the system, providing jobs
for workers, goods and services for consumers, prosperity for com-
munities, and strong capital markets for the continuous economic growth
of society. 261  Thus, the corporation's main purpose should be to
increase the returns to its shareholders, and the law should be structured
to avoid distracting corporations from that goal.
B. Comments
Although the nexus of contracts theory is the dominant legal
1259, 1273 (1982). The nexus of contracts theory does not accommodate the concepts
of corporate moral agency or personhood. It is an economic theory that understandably
speaks in economic terms, not in the language of moral philosophy. Yet, the theory can
be used to affirm the conclusions of those who argue against the moral responsibility of
corporations from a moral philosophy standpoint. See discussion of philosophical
arguments rejecting corporate moral personhood supra Part III.A.
259. Milton Friedman famously argued that "there is one and only one social
responsibility of business-to use its resources and engage in activities designed to
increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game .... " MILTON
FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962). Some commentators argue that
wealth maximization itself can be the most direct route to achieving a variety of moral
ends. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Law and Economics: An Apologia, in
CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT 208, 210-12 (Michael W. McConnell et
al. eds., 2001).
260. See Michael E. DeBow & Dwight R. Lee, Shareholders, Nonshareholders and
Corporate Law: Communitarianism and Resource Allocation, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 393,
416-19 (1993); see also Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Social Responsibility of Boards of
Directors and Stockholders in Change of Control Transactions: Is There any "There"
There?, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1169, 1170-71 (2002) (describing the belief that "a
stockholder-focused approach will, in the long run, generate the greatest benefit for
corporate employees and the societies in which corporations operate"). Christopher
Stone refers to this as the "polestar" argument because its emphasis on shareholder
primacy is not based on supposed obligations to the shareholders per se, but on the
belief that shareholder primacy "chart[s] a straight course toward what is best for the
society as a whole." STONE, supra note 35, at 85.
261. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 242, at 38; see also Mark J. Roe, The
Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization, 149 U. PA. L.
REV. 2063, 2065-66 (2001) (describing the utilitarian basis for the shareholder wealth
maximization norm).
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academic paradigm of the corporation and corporate law, 26 2  it is
certainly not without its critics. 261 Some argue that the theory assumes
perfect, complete, discrete, and purposive contracting by rational
economic actors, but, in the real world, contracts can and often do fail
due to the bounded rationality and intrinsic limits on the problem-
solving abilities of human parties.26 Others believe the theory fails to
acknowledge that private contracting and economic markets operate
against a backdrop of public law, and that the state is always a non-
neutral party to the corporate contract.265 Still others speculate on a
deeper level that the acceptance of neoclassical economic theory with its
emphasis on the pursuit of self-interest and profit maximization is, in
part, responsible for such societal harms as the failure of Enron and
262. See Allen, supra note 243, at 1400; Winkler, supra note 256, at 122.
263. See, e.g., Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the
Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403 (1985); Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson,
The Illusion of Law: The Legitimating Schemas of Modern Policy and Corporate Law,
103 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2004); Charles M.A. Clark, Competing Visions: Equity and
Efficiency in the Firm, in RETHINKING THE PURPOSE OF BUSINESS, supra note 197, at
81; Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception That the Corporation Is a Nexus of
Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819 (1999); Lyman Johnson,
Individual and Collective Sovereignty in the Corporate Enterprise, 92 COLUM. L. REV.
2215 (1992); Alan Wolfe, The Modern Corporation: Private Agent or Public Actor?,
50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1673 (1993). See generally PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW,
supra note 160. Many critics nonetheless acknowledge the significant contribution the
contractual paradigm has made to corporate law. See, e.g., Thomas L. Hazen, The
Corporate Persona, Contract (and Market) Failure, and Moral Values, 69 N.C. L. REv.
273, 318 (1991) ("I am not suggesting that adherents to a law and economics analysis
have not made significant contributions. Indeed, economic analysis must play a
significant role in shaping our corporate law."); Johnson, supra, at 2217 (arguing that
even though "economics has not, will not, and should not, capture corporate law," the
law of corporations "has forever been changed (and bettered)" by the infusion of the
economic model of the firm (emphasis added)).
264. See Bratton, supra note 28, at 448-49; Bratton, supra note 196, at 183-84.
265. See Hazen, supra note 263, at 281 ("The current contractarian view, however,
disregards the fact that the sovereign is a party to [the] corporate contract."); Kent
Greenfield, From Metaphor to Reality in Corporate Law, 2 STAN. AGORA 59, 63 (2001)
("Even the so-called laissez-faire marketplace is shot through with government, and
even the most basic common law entitlements are functions of legal rules."); Thomas
W. Joo, The Modern Corporation and Campaign Finance: Incorporating Corporate
Governance Analysis into First Amendment Jurisprudence, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 64-65
(2001) ("In reality, the market operates against a complex background of legal rules.
The fact that these rules resist private ordering adds force to the ... argument that the
state cannot remain neutral with respect to the allocation of entitlements.").
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other corporate catastrophes.
2 66
What seems to bother most of the critics of the nexus of contracts
theory is that it is incomplete. It offers too narrow a focus, too simplistic
a response to the question, what is a corporation? Although the theory
has descriptive and normative force, it still seems to present, for many
observers, an impoverished way of explaining much of what goes on in
corporate life on a daily basis.267 It does not give significance to the
social, moral, and political aspects of the corporate person. Ultimately,
the fundamental dissatisfaction that many people have with the
economic model is that it provides a "thin view of a much more com-
plicated reality. 26 8
This complaint, however, can be lodged against any one of the
personhood theories of the corporation discussed in this Article. By
itself, no one theory of the corporate person can adequately and
comprehensively explain the nature, role, and purpose of the
corporation. The corporation is at once an economic institution, a
political force, a social entity, a legal actor, a potential moral agent, a
266. See Cynthia A. Williams, A Tale of Two Trajectories, 75 FORDHAM L. REV.
1629, 1649-50 (2006). There is deep concern that the concept of social and moral obli-
gation is undermined by the law and economics theories currently taught in law schools.
See id. at 1659; see also James Boyd White, How Should We Talk About Corporations?
The Languages of Economics and of Citizenship, 94 YALE L.J. 1416, 1423 (1985)
(arguing that the economic model of wealth underlying the nexus of contracts theory
does not account for the true value to the world of wealth that is not reducible to
contract exchanges: "open spaces; clean air; good health; an educated population
engaged in fulfilling work and leisure; the sense that we all have a stake in the quality
of our common life, which alone can make streets safe and clean; and so on. That form
of social and cultural wealth is the most valuable kind for all of us .... ).
267. Many commentators argue that the contractarian view of the corporation does
not account for real worlo oractice.
People working together in the business do not help each other, work out problems
together, grow in competence through shared experience and so on because they have
negotiated contracts with each other where it is clear what is the nature of the
exchange, what is due, how it is to be paid for, what are the sanctions if the contract is
not fulfilled, what are the "get-out" clauses. Businesses would grind to a halt if
people adopted this kind of attitude in practice towards their working together within
the business.
Naughton, supra note 197, at 35 n.9 (quoting Helen Alford, Barbara Sena & Yuliya
Shcherbinina, Lecture, Philosophical Underpinnings and Basic Concepts for a Dialogue
Between CST and CSR on the "Good Company" 2 (Oct. 2005) (transcript on file with
the Ave Maria Law Review)).
268. Kennedy, supra note 207, at 24.
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spiritual instrument, and more. Thus, the personhood of corporations is
necessarily multi-dimensional. Each theory looks at the corporation
from a different angle and highlights a different side of the entity. The
economic nexus of contracts theory of the corporation is an especially
useful tool because it focuses our attention on critical aspects of the
corporation. But it is only one tool, and there are many others.
Those who favor the economic theory believe no other theory of the
firm presents a credible alternative to the unitary nexus of contracts
model. That belief may have validity, but it misses the point to some
degree. It assumes we prefer to have a single theory that can explain
and predict corporate behavior. If we must choose one or the other, the
argument goes, the nexus of contracts model is "better" than all others. I
am not convinced such a choice needs to be made. Why do we have to
have a single, unitary theory of the corporate person? Is it really
necessary to say that at bottom the corporation is essentially a nexus of
contracts, or essentially a legal fiction, or essentially a social institution,
or essentially anything? In my view, the multi-dimensional nature of the
corporate person defies unitary classification. As the next section
argues, the corporation is an extremely complex entity, and, if we are to
understand its nature and purpose in our world, we must be open to
seeing it from many different vantage points.
VIII. MULTI-DIMENSIONAL MODEL OF THE CORPORATE PERSON
As we have seen, the corporate person is more than merely a legal
actor. Moral philosophy suggests the possibility that corporations are
moral persons with the moral responsibility to act in ways that are just,
and to conduct their business activities in accordance with moral norms
that go beyond what the law requires. Organization theory highlights
the sociological and psychological dimensions of organizational be-
havior, demonstrating that the corporate person has its own character
and culture, through which it not only exerts considerable influence over
its internal members, but also maintains a certain image and an iden-
tifiable presence in society. Political theory and philosophy shed a dif-
ferent light on the corporate person. The lighting in one political
pluralist setting casts the corporate person in the role of a mediating
institution, serving as a buffer between the individual and the coercive
power of the state. However, the lighting in a contrasting pluralist
setting reveals a corporate person who wields just as much power as the
state. This political power can pose a threat to democracy if left un-
checked; the state must serve as a countervailing force to protect
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individuals from corporate power. Religious thinkers focus on an en-
tirely different aspect of the corporate person and see it as a center for
the spiritual flourishing of its members and society. By cultivating
virtues and the common good in a manner that is unique to the corporate
person, the corporation takes on theological significance. Economic
theory emphasizes the contractual exchanges that are so critical to cor-
porate activity; the corporation resembles a marketplace where
individuals draw mutual benefits from their bargains with each other.
When the various academic disciplines are combined, they capture
a picture of the corporation that is a composite of all the various images.
The goal should not be to oppose them against each other as if one might
ultimately triumph over the other, but for each to inform and challenge
the others. By simultaneously using these different modes, we move
closer to discovering what the corporate person actually is and how we
as natural persons are to relate to it.
The philosophy of human personhood is illuminating in this
context. Philosophers have concluded that there really is no such thing
as the concept of the human person.2 69 This is because we want the
concept of personhood to fill so many different functions, but the variety
of functions that the concept of a person performs cannot plausibly be
combined in a single, all-encompassing theory.270 Even if we could find
a common denominator underlying all the different theories of human
269. See Amelie 0. Rorty, Persons and Personae, in THE PERSON AND THE HUMAN
MIND: ISSUES IN ANCIENT AND MODERN PHILOSOPHY 21 (Christopher Gill ed., 1990)
[hereinafter THE PERSON AND THE HUMAN MIND]; see also Adam Morton, Why There Is
No Concept of a Person, in THE PERSON AND THE HUMAN MIND, supra, at 39. See
generally WHAT IS A PERSON? (CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN BIOMEDICINE, ETHICS, AND
SOCIETY) (Michael F. Goodman ed., 1988).
270. See Rorty, supra note 269, at 35. Rorty describes no less than seven important
functions that the concept of the person fulfills. See id. at 22-35; see also Margaret J.
Radin, The Colin Ruagh Thomas O'Fallon Memorial Lecture on Reconsidering
Personhood, 74 OR. L. REv. 423, 424 (1995) (describing different perspectives on
personhood); Margaret J. Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 962-
65 (1982) (discussing several different philosophical theories of personhood). The
concept of the person is tied to, but distinguishable from, the concepts of the self and of
the human being. See David Wiggins, The Person as Object of Science, as Subject of
Experience, and as Locus of Value, in PERSONS AND PERSONALITY, supra note 25, at 56,
57; see also TILL VIERKANT, IS THE SELF REAL?: AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE
PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPT OF 'SELF' BETWEEN COGNITIVE SCIENCE AND SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION (2003) (discussing the concept of the self from multiple academic
perspectives).
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personhood, it would be so general that it would not be very helpful. As
a result, we must conclude that "there is no such thing as the concept of
personhood, that there are only highly regionalized functions that seem,
erroneously, to be subsumable in a structured concept."2 71 A man can be
seen and spoken of as occupying different identities for different
functions: he is a shrewd businessman, a conscientious neighbor, a
patriotic citizen, a Christian believer, an affectionate husband, a strict
father, and an amateur triathlete. These are all aspects of the same
person. Even so, the corporate person can be seen as performing dif-
ferent functions depending on what or whom it is in relation to, and
these are all aspects of the same entity.
One might argue, however, that the human person is far more
complicated a subject than the corporation, which is simply a human
creation designed to perform limited and defined functions. From this
view, while it may be impossible to settle on a single theory of the
concept of the human person, it is surely feasible to construct a unitary
theory of the corporate person, given the more simplistic nature of the
corporation. This argument is not convincing. If human beings are so
complex that they defy easy classification into one concept of the
person, the corporation is even more so, as it is made up of complex
human beings plus their ever shifting interrelationships with each other.
The collective actions and goals of human persons create another layer
of complexity and identity that makes it much more difficult to classify
the corporate person.
The concept of the corporate person depends on a mass of legal and
non-legal considerations: philosophical, moral, metaphysical, political,
historical, sociological, psychological, theological, and economic. The
corporation as viewed from one of these schools of thought is not the
same corporation as viewed from the others. Of course, there is always
the fear that combining academic disciplines will serve only to jumble
disconnected terms together and muddle the picture. Joining concepts of
the person from different disciplines with completely different meanings
may be unhelpful if it causes greater confusion when these terms and
concepts conflict.2 72 Nonetheless, it is worth the risk because it gives us
a more accurate view of a complicated reality. The "neat division of
labor [among academic disciplines] was never intended to suggest the
271. Rorty, supra note 269, at 38.
272. See Christopher D. Stone, From a Language Perspective, 90 YALE L.J. 1149,
1159 (1981) (noting the dangers of distortion of meaning when terms from other
academic disciplines are imported into discussions of the law).
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neat division of reality. 273 By narrowly limiting ourselves to certain
disciplinary viewpoints, we face a danger far greater than a muddled
picture. We risk losing our ability to view reality in all of its fullness
and to describe it in accurate terms: "Increasingly, it seems, academics
expect reality to conform to our own discipline's necessarily limited
models, rather than trying to synthesize knowledge among disciplines to
bring the models closer to reality. This is a variation of the problem:
when you have but a hammer, [you think] everything's a nail. 274
We know that the various theories of the corporate person exist in
tension with each other. The consequences of relying more on one
theory than another can be great because each one supports its own
normative political or social philosophy. The deep dichotomies between
viewpoints reveal conflicting ideals. For example, theories driven by a
methodological individualist outlook tend to see the corporation as an
aggregate of individuals and place importance on protecting individual
rights. The nexus of contracts theory falls into this category. By the
same token, theories that emphasize methodological individualism con-
clude that corporate responsibility ultimately boils down to individual
responsibility. Moral philosophical theories that deny any corporate
moral personhood reflect this view.
In contrast, theories that assume humans are inherently social
beings who naturally form groups tend to see the corporation as a
separate entity with its own group identity. Political pluralist theories
endorse this concept and give corporations an important role in
promoting democracy and protecting individuals from state power. At
the same time, accepting the corporation as a distinct entity induces the
belief that the corporation itself is responsible for certain behaviors.
Theories in organizational behavior and business ethics subscribe to this
idea when they hold corporations responsible for corporate cultures that
influence the actions of individual members.
In all of these examples, determining which model is appropriate
depends on whether one prefers to see human beings as atomistic
individuals or as inherently social animals. That dichotomy undoubtedly
produces conflict, but it is not ultimately irresolvable. We might be
inclined to say that human beings, with their complex nature, fit both
paradigms to some degree, and therefore, corporations as even more
273. Owen D. Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law: Some Objections Considered,
67 BROOK. L. REV. 207, 226 (2001).
274. Id. (emphasis added).
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complex entities, have many of the properties described by the different
theories in similarly varying degrees.
I do not argue that the simultaneous juxtaposition of all of the
theories of corporate personhood will be without contention and
controversy. There will be, as there always has been, discord among the
contrasting normative implications of the various theories. But the more
complete a picture we have of the subject of debate, the more informed
the debate will be. In my mind, there is no one "right" or "best"
description of the corporate person for all purposes and for all time.275
The corporation is a constantly evolving entity that shapes and is shaped
by society's shifting views of the nature of corporate life. Who is to say
that the dichotomies and conflicts embedded in current theories of the
corporate person will always exist? Our circumstances, our economy,
our political structures, our laws, our belief systems, and our culture can
change and, with them, our view of corporations. The corporate person
is malleable, rather than fixed, and its role in our society is, in part, a
product of our own constantly changing moral, legal, philosophical, and
political imagination.
What does all of this mean for the law? Just as corporations evolve
and our theories of corporations change, the law must develop in a
continuously dynamic way. The law is not fixed, nor should it be. As
many jurists have noted, the genius of the law is that it "is not simply a
,, 276deductive exercise" or "an inevitable working out of anything, 27  but
rather, it is "a living organism, ever growing and expanding to meet the
problems and needs of changing social and economic conditions., 277 As
275. It may, in fact, turn out that the different theories of the corporation constitute
answers to different questions or may be tools for different tasks. Cf HARTMAN, supra
note 134, at 112 n.9 (citing EDWIN M. HARTMAN, CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF
ORGANIZATION THEORY (1988)). All of the theories might legitimately be used at
different times for different purposes.
276. Allen, supra note 239, at 278. Chancellor Allen concludes that the law of
corporations must be "worked out, not deduced, [and] [i]n this process, efficiency
concerns, ideology, and interest group politics will commingle with history . . . to
produce an answer that will hold for here and now, only to be torn by some future stress
and to be reformulated once more." Id. at 281. Many commentators agree that the law
does not deduce or discover legal concepts. Instead, it makes the rules that then help
shape economic reality. See Warren J. Samuels, The Idea of the Corporation as a
Person: On the Normative Significance of Judicial Language, in CORPORATIONS AND
SOCIETY, supra note 30, at 113, 126.
277. Russick v. Hicks, 85 F. Supp. 281, 285 (W.D. Mich. 1949). Many observers
hold the same view of the United States Constitution, i.e., it is a living, growing
document. See, e.g., WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE
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we formulate laws that regulate corporate activity, we must remain
flexible and adaptable as various theories of corporations bring different
issues to light. The law, in order to balance the private rights of indi-
viduals with the legitimate public concerns of society, should be
sensitive to the multi-dimensional nature of the corporate person and the
different ways in which it can be viewed.
Some may object to this approach because the inevitable clash of
theories can make the construction of law difficult and can lead to
inconsistencies. Indeed, some commentators bemoan the fact that the
body of law with respect to corporate legal personhood often seems
incoherent and contradictory. 278 There is a sense that judicial use of
corporate legal personhood theories results in post-hoc rationalizations
for chosen outcomes and legal reasoning that is purely result-oriented.279
The competing theories of the corporation contribute to the indeter-
minacy of the law, and this is perceived as being arbitrary and
unjustified. 280 The implication is that we should adopt a single, coherent
theory of the corporate person that, when methodically applied, will
produce clear and consistent rules of law.
The problem with this viewpoint is that it misperceives both the
value of indeterminacy in the law and the advantage of having multi-
dimensional theories of the corporation. The law retains power and
legitimacy precisely because it does not emphatically state: "the corpo-
UNITED STATES 69 (1908) ("[T]he Constitution of the United States is not a mere
lawyers' document: it is a vehicle of life, and its spirit is always the spirit of the age.").
278. Most commentators find this to be especially true in the constitutional law
arena. See, e.g., Michael D. Rivard, Comment, Toward a General Theory of
Constitutional Personhood: A Theory of Constitutional Personhood for Transgenic
Humanoid Species, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1425, 1466 (1992) (asserting that "the law of
corporate personhood conflicts with itself: corporations are entitled to some liberty
rights but not others, and the Court has offered no clear guidelines to support these
distinctions").
279. See, e.g., Note, What We Talk About When We Talk About Persons: The
Language of a Legal Fiction, 114 HARV. L. REv. 1745, 1754 (2001) (noting that "the
various theories of the person that American courts can deploy permit virtually any
result" raising the question whether "corporate personhood jurisprudence is purely
result oriented"); see also Krannich, supra note 48, at 103; Rivard, supra note 278, at
1451.
280. John Dewey criticized the lack of clear-cut logical or practical lines between
the different theories of personhood, and he argued that "[e]ach theory has been used to
serve the same ends, and each has been used to serve opposing ends." Dewey, supra
note 7, at 669.
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ration is X. ' 2' The conflicting themes that underlie the theories of the
corporation-real entity v. aggregate, contract v. concession, indi-
vidualism v. sociality, public v. private, shareholder primacy v. common
good-all exist in constant opposition. They produce contradictory
visions of corporate life. However, the "tendency toward contradiction
should be accepted, not feared .... The contradictions are wholesome.
Studying and reflecting on their interplay in the law enhances our
,,282positive and normative understanding. As a complex entity that
incorporates all of these contradictory concepts, the corporation cannot,
nor should it, be reduced to a single simplistic theoretical framework
that would necessarily be incomplete. A multi-dimensional approach
might make for inconsistent law, but it recognizes the reality of the
extraordinary and multi-faceted nature of the corporation. "[T]he flaws
of inconsistency are far less serious than those of unreality.' 28 3
Indeterminacy is built into the law to allow for selective application
of different theories of the corporate person, depending on the situation
and the issues to be decided. Because the corporation is a bundle of
contrasting and coinciding concepts, corporate law must mediate be-
tween the various conceptual viewpoints. When a problem occurs that
raises two valid but inconsistent normative demands, mediation is
required, and choosing between the two is ultimately a matter of
judgment.8 4 Here is where the law benefits from drawing upon a multi-
dimensional view of the corporation. This Article recommends that cor-
porate law adopt a broader, more flexible totality of the circumstances
approach to legal decision-making and problem-solving. By considering
the descriptive and normative components of different theories of the
corporate person at once, the law adopts a richer, more informed con-
ception of the corporation. Equipped with this broader perspective, the
legal decision-maker is able to render a judgment of high quality, rather
281. See J. William Callison, Indeterminacy, Irony and Partnership Law, 2 STAN.
AGORA 73, 76 (2001).
282. Bratton, supra note 28, at 464-65.
283. Wolfe, supra note 263, at 1676. Clear, simple rules of law that are fixed and
consistent may offer predictability and stability, but they can also stifle innovation,
collaborative problem solving, beneficial negotiations, wealth-maximizing trades, and
the operation of multiple forces to resolve socio-legal problems. I am indebted to Tony
Arnold for emphasizing this important point. See, e.g., Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold,
Working Out an Environmental Ethic: Anniversary Lessons from Mono Lake, 4 WYO.
L. REv. 1, 34-39 (2004) (arguing that the role of environmental law is to upset the status
quo and thereby encourage negotiation, innovation, and flexible problem solving).
284. See Bratton, supra note 196, at 214.
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than a judgment that reflects only a narrow set of concerns.28 5 To aim to
adopt a clear-cut, unitary theory of the corporation is to close oneself off
to the possibility of drawing on the insights of different theories even as
they compete. Thus, the indeterminacy of the law should not be re-
garded as theoretical failure, but as the beneficial result of a more open-
ended approach to corporate personhood.
As theorists, we often strive for coherence and consistency, but
perhaps we need to find a way to be more comfortable with ambiguity
and conflict. The different spheres of corporate personhood each have a
measure of legitimacy. Although they highlight separate aspects of the
corporation and even conflict at times, they work together in tandem to
give us a more accurate picture of the corporation and its role in society.
If we want to deepen our understanding of the corporation, we must be
willing to analyze it from diverse viewpoints. We might all benefit from
moving toward a multi-dimensional view of the corporate person, rather
than insisting on the formulation and acceptance of a single theory that
will describe the nature of corporations consistently in all circumstances.
We should adopt a more nuanced, multi-faceted, and perhaps "messier"
model of the corporation, and we should do so, not with a sigh of
resignation or defeat in that we could not compose a more neat and tidy
theory of the corporation, but with a satisfaction in knowing that the
complex nature of corporations deserves no less than a multi-
dimensional definition of the corporate person.
IX. CONCLUSION
The place of corporations in our society and in our law has always
been deeply ambiguous. Corporations have been called the "angels and
devils" of our economy and politics. 286 We fear their bigness, their
power, and complexity. "Yet we also plainly want bigness. We feel that
we need it; above all, we irresistibly patronize it.', 287 Perhaps it is this
deep and intractable dissonance that explains why "our law and our
285. See id. This may lead to privileging different concepts at different points, but
this is the nature of mediation. See Bratton, supra note 28, at 465.
286. Howard J. Graham, An Innocent Abroad. The Constitutional Corporate
"Person", 2 UCLA L. REv. 155, 155 (1955).
287. Id. at 157; see also CORPORATIONS AND SOCIETY, supra note 30, at 4 ("We thus
appear to want things both ways: we know, at least intuitively, about the power of
business and fear it; at the same time, few wish to forgo the bounty that corporate
enterprise provides.").
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society [has] been schizophrenic on the subject of corporation law for a
long time." '288 Perhaps this is also why we find the ongoing debate over
the prudence of bailing out our nation's giant corporations to be so dif-
ficult to resolve. The corporation fills multiple roles and serves many
different purposes simultaneously. We see in it a creature that is worth
saving because it touches so many lives in different and profound ways.
At the same time, we wonder whether it is best to leave it alone to
succeed or fail of its own accord. One's ultimate opinion depends very
much on one's definition of the nature and role of the corporate person
in our society, and that definition can be extraordinarily complex.
The corporation is, of course, a fictional legal person with the
capacity and standing to do the things that legal actors are entitled to do.
To define the corporation as only a legal person, however, is to overlook
the many other personas of the corporation that cannot be described in
legal terms. As this Article has demonstrated, the corporation can also
be spoken of in language that is derived from philosophy, moral theory,
political science, sociology, psychology, organizational theory, theol-
ogy, and economic theory. This list is not exhaustive. The corporation
is a unique entity that can be studied under multiple disciplines, each re-
vealing a different and significant aspect of the corporation's
personality.
Commentators have lamented that there is no one answer to the
"endlessly fascinating but inevitably indeterminate question of corporate
personhood.,, 28 9 The fact that there is no single overarching theory or
correct description of the corporate person has long been viewed as a
problem that continually defies resolution. But maybe the true problem
lies only in our perspective. I am reminded of an anecdote about a musi-
cian who is praised for solving a problem he never knew he had:
Once when I was playing for a musician, he complimented me on the
way I played a particular passage. He told me how well I handled a
certain modulation and added, "You don't realize in what a
remarkable way you have solved this problem!"
I must say, I was thunderstruck! In the first place, I was not even
aware that there was a modulation. (That shows how much I know
about music! I never think in terms of modulations. I do not deny
that they exist; I just don't think about them.) In the second place, I
288. Allen, supra note 239, at 264.
289. Millon, supra note 45, at 58; see also Callison, supra note 250, at 978;
Krannich, supra note 48, at 90.
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was totally unaware of any problem let alone solving one! The
whole idea of "problem solving," especially in music, strikes me as
so weird! Not only weird, but most disharmonious and destructive.
Is that how you think of life, as a series of problems to be solved?
No wonder you don't enjoy living more than you do!
To compliment a musician, or any other artist, on having "solved
problems" is to me absolutely analogous to complimenting the
waves of the ocean for solving such a complex system of partial
differential equations. Of course the ocean does its "waving" in
accordance with these differential equations, but it hardly solves
them. I do not claim to know whether the ocean is or is not a
conscious being, but if the ocean does think (which wouldn't
surprise me), the one thing I'm sure the ocean does not think about is
differential equations.
Perhaps I am allergic to the word "problem." If so, I am grateful for
this allergy. Some of you will say I am only quibbling about words.
This is not so. It is ideas that count, not words. And I believe that
one who feels he is "solving problems" lives very differently from
one who does not feel this way. I believe my objection to the notion
of "problem" is due to my deep conviction that the moment one
labels something as a "problem," that's when the real problem
starts. 290
Lawyers and legal academics naturally tend to see things as
problems that need to be fixed, as issues that need resolution. We think
in terms of crises and dilemmas for which we seek to find solutions and
closure. In the context of corporate personhood, we have been prone to
characterize the lack of a simple all-encompassing theory as a problem
requiring the proposal of ever grander models of the corporation in an
attempt to solve the problem once and for all. Perhaps, however, the
problem lies not in the inability to construct such an overarching theory
but in characterizing that inability as a problem in the first place. Maybe
what we need to do is widen our myopic focus on the nature of the cor-
porate person and get used to speaking about corporations in more open,
multi-dimensional terms. In doing so, we might find that our biggest
problem has been our tacit disappointment over the failure to compose
that elusive all-embracing theory, when what we have is actually far
better: the opportunity to draw upon multiple interdisciplinary theories
290. RAYMOND M. SMULLYAN, THIS BOOK NEEDS No TITLE: A BUDGET OF LIVING
PARADOXES 79-80 (1980).
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at once to see the corporate person in all of its complexity, even when
those theories sometimes conflict or raise more questions than they
answer.
Notes & Observations
